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ABUNDANT  ENERGY  AT  LOW  COST iS fundamental  to a highly industri- 
alized  economy  like  the United  States.  The  American  way of life is hard  to 
visualize without commuters,  television, overheated  houses, aluminum 
cans,  and  jet setters;  yet it is equally  difficult  to conceive  of substitutes  for 
these hallmarks  of American  society if cheap energy were no longer 
available. 
Given  the dependence  on energy,  there  has been perennial  anxiety  over 
the adequacy  of the nation's  resources  for meeting  its apparently  insatiable 
appetite  for energy.  More  recently,  the concern  for adequacy  of energy  has 
been embedded  in a more general  pessimism  about the viability  of eco- 
nomic growth on a finite world.' This new and pessimistic  view about 
economic  growth  holds  that growth  is limited  by a finite  amount  of essen- 
tial, depletable  natural  resources.  In the process  of consuming  finite re- 
sources,  the world standard  of living descends  inexorably  toward  that of 
Neanderthal  man. 
Note: The research  underlying  this paper was supported  by the National Science 
Foundation.  I am grateful  for helpful  comments  by Gary  Haller,  Tjalling  C. Koopmans, 
Alan S. Manne, and members of the Brookings panel. In addition, Paul Krugman 
provided research  assistance extraordinary.  Remaining errors are, of course, my re- 
sponsibility. 
1. See Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich,  Population,  Resources,  Environment: 
Issues in Human  Ecology (W. H. Freeman, 1970); Jay W. Forrester,  World  Dynamics 
(Wright-Allen,  1971);  Donella H. Meadows  and others,  The  Limits  to Growth:  A Report 
for the Club  of Rome's  Project  on the  Predicament  of Mankind  (Universe  Books, 1972); 
"A Blueprint  for Survival,"  The  Ecologist,  Vol. 2 (January  1972), pp. 1-22. 
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If such a scenario  is plausible,  the crunch  probably  will be felt first  in 
energy resources.  For one thing, energy is an essential  input in many 
processes,  required  by the laws of physics.  Although  more efficient  use 
might  save  energy,  it simply  is not possible  to heat  houses,  produce  alumi- 
num, run transportation  systems,  or generate  electricity  without  it. With 
the exception  of food, no other  single  commodity  is so essential.  Second, 
energy  resources  are nonrenewable.  Aside from hydro,  no significant  use 
is now made of renewable  sources  (such as solar, geothermal,  or gravi- 
tational  energy,  or wood) in the United States. Third,  energy  resources 
cannot  be recycled.  Once  coal or petroleum  is burned  its energy  dissipates 
beyond  economical  recapture.  Finally,  the enormous  current  and  prospec- 
tive energy  consumption  raises  difficult  environmental  problems.  No cur- 
rently  used fuel is completely  clean,  economical,  and abundant. 
Energy  resources,  then, are a likely test case for examining  resource 
scarcity.  In what  follows,  I will first  explore  the use of markets  to allocate 
scarce  resources  over  time,  and  then  turn  explicitly  to an empirical  estimate 
of the efficient  allocation  of energy  resources. 
The Role of Markets  for Resources 
In the United States,  the prices  of appropriable  resources  have for the 
most part been determined  by market  forces.2  Why has public  policy ac- 
cepted  a laissez-faire  approach  to resource  pricing? 
The intellectual  basis  for allowing  market  determination  of prices  lies in 
the theory  of general  economic  equilibrium.  This  theory  assumes  that  there 
are consumers  with initial  resources  and given  preferences,  and producers 
operating  with well-defined  technical  relations.  The theory can embrace 
many  time  periods  and  uncertainty  about  the exact  demand  or supply  con- 
ditions;  but it assumes  convex production  and preference  sets, and that 
markets  exist for all goods, services,  and contingencies.  This means  that 
there  must  be futures  markets  for, say,  petroleum  and  coal  in the year  2000; 
and there  must be insurance  markets  for such contingencies  as the failure 
of breeder  processes  to become  economically  viable.  Also, all the costs and 
benefits  of a particular  process  of production  must be internalized  to the 
2. An appropriable  resource  is one for which all rewards  or penalties  from services 
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decision  maker.  Under  the above  conditions  a market  system  will have a 
general  equilibrium  of prices  and quantities.  There  is nothing  in such a 
market  system  that will ensure  an equitable  distribution  of consumption 
over space or time. But the equilibrium  will be efficient  in the sense  that 
there  is no way  of improving  the  lot of one  consumer  without  worsening  the 
lot of another.  Expressed  differently,  the prices  are appropriate  indicators 
of social scarcity  given the preferences  and initial endowments  of the 
society. 
The application  of the results  of market  equilibrium  analysis  to depleta- 
ble natural  resources  is straightforward.  In considering  these  I distinguish 
between extraction  costs,  the vector z(t),  or the marginal cost per unit of 
output excluding rents and royalties; and royalties,  the vector y(t),3 which 
are a reflection  of the presumed  scarcity  of a particular  resource.  The t 
refers  to the time period. 
Consider  a world  of certainty  and a time  horizon  of T years.4  There  are 
R(t) units of the resource  remaining  at any point of time, and extraction 
costs are zero up to the resource  limit. If alternative  assets  yield a rate of 
return,  r(t), the equilibrium  condition  for some owners  to hold and others 
to sell the resource  is equality  between  the rate of capital  gains  on the re- 
source  and  the interest  rate: 
(1)  Ay(t)  =r(t)  y(t) 
where  Ay  is the change  in y. Thus  the resource  price  rises  exponentially  at 
the interest  rate. 
There  is a family  of solutions  to equation  (1), each  having  different  levels 
of y. The unique  solution  depends  on the terminal  condition  that all re- 
sources  are  used  up at the end of the last period  (T): 
(2)  y(t), such that R(T) =  0. 
There  generally  will be a unique  set of prices  satisfying  (1) and  (2). 
3. I use "royalty"  to denote the difference  between price and marginal  extraction 
cost, a concept similar to rents on land. Royalties have many other meanings in re- 
source  economics. 
4. The terminal  point can be a sticky issue. If there exists what I later call a "back- 
stop technology"  (roughly, a substitute  process with infinite resource  base), then T is 
the time at which transition  to it is completed;  if resources  are finite and essential,  and 
no backstop  technology  exists, T is the time of extinction.  For an analysis  of the second 
case, see Tjalling  C. Koopmans, "Some Observations  on 'Optimal'  Economic Growth 
and Exhaustible  Resources,"  Cowles Foundation  Discussion Paper  356 (Cowles Foun- 
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More interesting  is the case where  extraction  costs are positive.  Price, 
p(t), is the sum of current  extraction  cost and royalty: 
(3)  p(t) =  z(t) +  y(t) . 
In efficient  allocations,  resources  are extracted  when  their  present  value  is 
maximized.  The present  value of the profit from selling a unit of the 
resource  at time t when extraction cost is zo is [p(t) -  zo] exp(-  rt), and this 
is maximized if t is chosen so that Ap(t) =  r[p(t) -  zo],  or when 
(4)  AP r=(r -  ZO)  =  ap  (P-0  =  Y 
If production  of a resource  with  cost zo occurs  for all t, then  (4) must  hold 
for all t. Moreover, for all periods when sales occur, (p -  zo)exp(-rt)  is 
constant-this being  a solution  to (4). During  periods  when sales are oc- 
curring,  Ay/y  =  r, so (1) is satisfied. Since y = p  -  zo  is the royalty at time 
of extraction,  the new condition  for recovering  a resource  is that the ex- 
pected  rate  of increase  of the price  of the resource  be less than or equal  to 
the interest  rate  times  the share  of royalties  in the total  resource  price.  This 
rate will always  be less than the interest  rate.  If extraction  costs are con- 
stant, royalties  will again satisfy  the exponential  relation  shown in (1); 
since  the share  of the royalty  increases  to unity,  the resource  price  will ac- 
celerate  toward  a rate of increase  of r. 
In the analysis  of programs  developed  below,  the path of prices  can be 
made  considerably  more  explicit.  Today's  energy  technology  is highly  de- 
pendent  on resources  that are very cheap  to extract  but relatively  scarce 
when  viewed  over  a very  long time  horizon.  In this technology  royalties  to 
scarce  low-cost  resources  may  be relatively  important  in today's  price.  Over 
the next century  or so, many  low-cost  energy  resources  will be largely  de- 
pleted,  leaving  more abundant  but also more expensive  resources.  Ulti- 
mately,  if and when  the transition  is completed  to an economy  based  on 
plentiful  nuclear  resources  (either  through  breeder  or fusion  reactors),  the 
economic  importance  of scarcity of resources  will disappear,  and capital 
and labor costs alone will determine  prices.  This ultimate  technology- 
resting  on a very  abundant  resource  base-is  the "backstop  technology" 
and is crucial  to the allocation  of scarce  energy  resources. 
An oversimplified  example  will show how the backstop  technology  en- 
ters.  Consider  two  processes  for generating  electricity.  One  process  uses  one 
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supply  (R recoverable  units)  and free to extract.  The second  process  uses 
nuclear  fuel, which is superabundant  and free, and K dollars'  worth of 
capital  per unit of output.  Assume  that the rate of interest  is r, and that 
demand  is inelastic,  with D units  of electricity  demanded  per  year.  Clearly, 
the petroleum  process  will be used first, and the switch to the nuclear 
process  (the backstop  technology)  will take place  R/D years  out. 
Prices  are  easy  to calculate  along  an efficient  path.  At the switch  point  T, 
the price  of electricity,  p, is given  by the cost of the backstop  technology, 
p(T) = (r +  3)K, 
where  8 is the depreciation  rate and K is the capital  requirement  of the 
backstop  technology.  This  implies  that  the price  and therefore  the royalty 
on petroleum  at the switch  point  are  also  p(T). But then the price  and the 
royalty  on petroleum  along the efficient  path from now to T are 
A  A  A 
(5)  y(t) = p(t) = p(T) exp [-r(T  -  t)] =  (r +  S)K  exp [-r(T  -  t)]. 
The royalty  on the scarce  resource  is simply  the switch  price,  p(T), dis- 
counted  back  to the present. 
There  are  three  important  elements  in determining  current  royalty,  y(O): 
the cost of the backstop  technology,  the interest  rate,  and the switch  date. 
The  capital  requirement  of the backstop  technology  enters  linearly.  The  in- 
terest  rate  enters  positively  as a linear  function  of the cost of the backstop 
technology  and  negatively  as a discount  factor  applying  to the switch  date. 
For fixed  T, a higher  interest  rate lowers  y(O)  if T(r +  6) <  1 and raises 
y(O)  if T(r  +  6) >  1. 
The switch  date  T enters  in an exponential  way  in much  the same  way  as 
the  interest  rate.  Recall  that  T = R/D. If the amount  of resources  doubles, 
or demand  halves,  the switch  date  is doubled.  This  lowers  the royalty  by a 
factor  of exp(- rR/D). Such  an effect  is very  powerful:  if current  royalty  is 
one-tenth  of the price  of the backstop  technology,  then  a change  in supply 
or demand  that  doubles  the switch  date  means  that  current  royalty  will  fall 
to one-hundredth  of the price  of the backstop  technology. 
One further  feature  of efficient  paths is worth  mentioning.  In realistic 
cases,  there  are  extraction  costs  for the early  technology,  say z. So the path 
of prices is given by 
p(t) =  z +  [(r +  6)K -  f] exp [-r(T  -  t)]. 
The feature  of this path is that the run-up  of prices  can be a big surprise. 
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nate. Thus,  for a 10 percent  interest  rate, if royalty  is 5 percent  of price, 
prices  in successive  decades  rise  at rates  of 8 percent,  19  percent,  41 percent, 
76 percent,  112 percent,  and up to a maximum  of 159 percent.  A high 
interest  rate keeps royalties  low initially,  but when they rise they really 
take off. This acceleration  can wreak  havoc  for producers  who are locked 
into capital  goods and have extrapolative  expectations. 
This simplified  example  illustrates  the technique  for estimating  efficient 
energy  prices  in the next section.  As equation  (5) indicates,  if the price  of 
the backstop  technology  is low, if the switch date is far off, or if the 
interest  rate  is high,  then the royalty  on energy  resources  is relatively  low. 
Conversely,  if these  conditions  are  reversed,  the  royalty  on energy  resources 
is high. The question  explored  in the next section  is whether  the current 
market-determined  royalty  on energy  resources  is close to that associated 
with  an efficient  path  for the allocation  of energy  resources.  Unfortunately, 
the calculation  required  to get  the answer  is extremely  complex.  Since  there 
are many sources  and grades  of energy  resources,  many uses, and many 
demand  categories,  each with peculiar  specifications,  calculation  of the 
optimal  path and the switch  points  for different  resources  is cumbersome. 
A further  extension  of the model considers  the functioning  of resource 
markets  under  uncertainty.  The complete  general  equilibrium  analysis  dis- 
cussed  above  requires  not only  a complete  set of futures  markets,  but  also a 
complete  set of insurance  markets  or contingent  commodities  markets.  The 
insurance  markets  would span all economically  relevant  events, such as 
whether  and when breeder  reactors  become available;  what the future 
course of population  growth  will be; what happens  in Mideast  politics; 
whether  very  large  oil reserves  in Alaska  will be recoverable;  whether  en- 
vironmental  policy  will  be tough  or  lenient.  In each  case,  a contingent  com- 
modity  would  be sold:  for example,  one barrel  of crude  in January  1984,  if 
the trans-Alaska  pipeline  is not built.  It can be shown  that  the price  system 
is ex ante efficient  as long as a complete  set of futures  markets  exists. 
An important  difference  between  the model  and the real  world  is that a 
full set of futures  and insurance  markets  is not available.  Although  long- 
term  contracts  are often made-these being rough  substitutes  for futures 
markets-they are  relatively  rare;  and  I am unaware  of any  insurance  mar- 
kets  for selling  resources  contingent  on the state  of the world.5 
5. The sale, option, or leasehold  arrangements  currently  employed  for oil-, gas-, and 
ore-bearing  lands are not good substitutes  for futures  markets  (1) because  they repre- 
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What  are  the possible  consequences  of the absence  of a complete  set of 
futures  and  insurance  markets?  Three  problems  might  be serious. 
The first  complication  concerns  the appropriate  discount  rate to use in 
resource  decisions.  Recall  from  equation  (1) that  the equilibrium  condition 
for the resource  market  is that prices  rise at the same  rate as the interest 
rate.  In an uncertain  world,  this means  that  prices  rise  at the discount  rate 
appropriate  for  the owners  of the  resource.  It has  often  been  argued  that  the 
discount  rate  used  in the United States  for private  investment  is generally 
too high.  The  sources  of the positive  differential  between  private  and  social 
discount  rates  are risk and taxes. 
In the absence  of perfect  risk and insurance  markets,  the owners  of re- 
sources  will  bear  risks  associated  with  price  volatility,  the  incursion  of com- 
peting  resources  into established  markets,  the advent  of new technologies, 
and  so forth.  Many  economists  have  argued  that  such risks  are not always 
social  risks  because  they  can  be widely  spread  over  the population,  or more 
precisely,  because  the effects  of risk  on output  are  very  small  relative  to av- 
erage  income.6  If this  is the  case,  then  the  private  discount  rate  will  be above 
the appropriate  social  discount  rate.  A second  force  that  points  in the same 
direction  is the existence  of taxes on capital income. An investment  in 
resources  that  has  an annual  rate  of capital  gain  of rb  has  an after-tax  rate  of 
return  ra =  rb(l  -  T)  (r is the tax on capital  income).  Again,  if the pretax 
interest  rate is the social discount  rate,  then the presence  of capital  taxes 
will make the equilibrium  rate of capital gain too high. Tax rates vary 
greatly,  of course,  from  virtually  zero  for  petroleum  extraction  to more  than 
50 percent  for capital  gains on land or for royalties  accruing  to corpora- 
tions; but the existence  of general  capital  taxes  causes  a distortion  in the 
required  rate of return. 
The distortion  of the interest  rate is a particularly  serious  problem  in 
natural  resources.  As can  be seen  in equations  (1) to (4), too high  an interest 
rate casts a long shadow over the future.  When royalties  dominate  the 
price, too high an interest  rate tilts the entire  price path in favor of the 
present,  with the result that resources  are consumed  too quickly. 
sales to ultimate  consumers  (say, utility  companies);  and (2) because  they are spot mar- 
kets or very short-run  futures markets.  In the cosmic framework  of the ultimate ex- 
haustion of fossil fuels or energy sources or phosphorus,  these transactions  cover a 
very short span. 
6. Prominent  in this discussion  has been the work of Kenneth  J. Arrow. See his Es- 
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The second possible complication  involves myopic decisions.  In the 
present  context,  "myopia"  means  that the planning  horizons  of economic 
agents  are  relatively  short. 
Myopic decisions  are a possibility  because of the absence  of futures 
markets.  Recall  that expected  capital  gains  play a crucial  role in resource 
decisions.  Take two polar strategies  toward  investment  in resources-an 
in-and-out  strategy  (buying  on the speculation  of short-term  gain)  or a buy- 
and-hold  strategy  (buying  with the intention  of selling  the ultimate  com- 
modity  under  the soil rather  than the land).  Up to now the buy-and-hold 
strategy  was assumed  to dominate.  Say that investors  have an in-and-out 
strategy,  buying  titles  to resources  with an eye to capital  gains  rather  than 
to selling  the  resources  directly,  and,  for simplicity,  that  all  investors  plan  to 
sell after one period.  This leads to the equilibrium  condition  outlined  in 
equation  (1) or (4) above:  the market  is in equilibrium  when  investors  ex- 
pect that the (one-period)  capital  gain on the asset is equal to the (risk- 
corrected)  one-period  interest  rate.  The most important  point is that this 
condition  has  no unique  solution;  rather,  the  path  depends  on expectations. 
Indeed,  a path  with  zero  royalties  will  satisfy  the  myopic  equilibrium-for  a 
while. 
The  missing  element  in this  system  is the "global  planner"  (or speculator) 
who calculates  the quantities  demanded  along  a price  path  to see whether 
they are consistent  with overall  availabilities  (the calculation  implicit  in 
equation  2). The reason  why pricing  of resources  might  be myopic  is that 
very  few  planners  have  the ability,  or perhaps  even  the  desire,  to check  con- 
sistency  for several  decades. 
The third  complication  that  may  arise  in resource  markets  is price  insta- 
bility. Recall that the price  includes  a recovery  cost and a royalty.  At a 
given moment,  the recovery  cost is well determined  by the current  tech- 
nology  and  factor  costs, but the royalty  is not; rather,  it depends  on future 
conditions  of supply  and demand.  More  precisely,  the royalty  calculation 
derives  from  knowledge  about  the  paths  of output  and  input  prices  over  the 
indefinite  future. 
Given  the structure  of markets,  the royalty  may exhibit  considerable  in- 
stability.  The  instability  results  from  the role  price  changes  play  in affecting 
both demand  and expectations  in spot markets.  A supplier  of a resource 
can observe  only current  and past resource  prices.  In line with earlier  dis- 
cussion, it seems reasonable  to assume  that, without information  from 
futures  markets,  the quantity  supplied  will be positively  related  to the dif- William D. Nordhaus  537 
ference  between  the interest  rate  and  the expected  rate of price  increase  of 
the resource.  Thus if prices are expected  to rise more rapidly  than the 
interest  rate,  suppliers  will  cut  down  on production  in anticipation  of future 
capital  gains.  The  response  of consumers,  however,  accelerates  this  process. 
As production  is cut back, prices  rise more rapidly,  and as they do, pro- 
ducers  expect even more rapid rises, leading to further  production  de- 
creases.  And so on. The same sort of instability  can be seen for price 
reductions  as well. 
The result  of this interaction  of supply  and demand  response  is that the 
royalty  component  of resource  price  may behave  in an unstable  manner. 
In the case described  above, royalty  determination  in spot markets  leads 
either  to a dynamically  unstable  or to an inefficient  path. 
It can be argued  on the basis of this discussion  that the market  mech- 
anism  now existing  in the United States  is an unreliable  means  of pricing 
and allocating  exhaustible  appropriable  natural  resources.  The absence  of 
futures  and insurance  markets  rules  out the theorems  usually  drawn  from 
general  equilibrium  theory.  The possibility  of instability  in resource  mar- 
kets is a further  complication.  The most serious  potential  obstacle  to the 
market's  (or anybody's)  finding  the correct  price  lies in determining  the 
appropriate  royalty,  or scarcity  rent, on exhaustible  resources.  The differ- 
ence  between  exhaustible  resources  and  other  commodities  is that  the share 
of royalties  is relatively  small  for these  others.  Unfortunately,  an estimate 
of whether  current  usage  is too fast or too slow cannot  be made  a priori; 
it can emerge  only from  a carefully  constructed  econometric  and engineer- 
ing model of the economy. 
Efficient  Allocation  of Energy  Resources 
The upshot  of the foregoing  discussion  is that markets,  in their  current 
form,  may  be unreliable  ways  to allocate  exhaustible  resources.  Energy  re- 
sources  are perhaps  the best example  of this problem.  They are essential, 
and perforce  their  consumption  stretches  over a very long period.  They, 
and  their  products,  have  no futures  markets.  Because  the availability  of re- 
sources  and  future  technologies  are  uncertain,  so is the path  of energy  con- 
sumption.  As if the basic  economic  problems  were  not sufficiently  compli- 
cated,  recently  there  has  been  considerable  political  interference,  expressed 
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regulation of prices of natural gas and petroleum products by the U.S. gov- 
ernment,  and the setting of environmental  standards  by virtually  everybody. 
It takes an act of faith to believe that "the market" can somehow see the 
proper allocation  through this  tangle  of  complexity,  uncertainty, and 
politics. 
What alternative  exists to relying on an incomplete set of markets?  In the 
face of this uncertainty, two basic approaches are open to finding the ap- 
propriate allocation.7 The most appropriate strategy-called  "indicative 
planning" by Meade-is  to match up future supplies and demands in a 
simulated market: the government summons all the citizens to a meeting in 
Yankee Stadium, gives them a set of questionnaires  (listing trial prices), and 
asks for their demands and supplies. The process continues until it yields a 
balanced set of supplies and demands.8 
While this approach is intriguing, all the current and future citizens can 
hardly gather in Yankee Stadium. Meade considers a second technique- 
econometric forecasting: 
If one knows  all  the  technological  and  behavioural  relationships  in the economy- 
that is to say, what  outputs  can be produced  with  what  inputs  and  how citizens  as 
entrepreneurs,  workers,  savers,  consumers,  etc., re-act  to changes  in prices,  costs, 
incomes,  interest  rates,  etc.-if  one knows  the starting  point of the economy,  that 
is to say the existing  capital  equipment  and so on-and  finally  if one knows  how 
the future  exogenous  variables  will behave,  and  we are  in fact assuming  that  there 
are no environmental  uncertainties-then  theoretically  ...  one should  be able to 
forecast  the future  course  of all prices  and quantities  in all markets.9 
What I propose to do is to find a middle ground between the two ap- 
proaches. On the one hand, there are considerable data on the supply side 
of the energy market-enough  to allow an intelligent guess as to how a 
profit-maximizing  firm would behave when faced with a set of current and 
future prices for energy resources and products. On the other hand, there is 
considerable uncertainty about the demand relations. To  determine the 
efficient  allocation of energy resources then requires  calculating how a com- 
plete set of spot and futures markets would allocate resources, given the 
best data available at the present time. 
7. This line of thought was suggested  by J. E. Meade in The Theory  of Indicative 
Planning  (Manchester  University  Press, 1970), and further  spelled out in his The Con- 
trolled  Economy  (State University  of New York Press, 1972). 
8. See Meade, Theory  of Indicative  Planning,  Chap. 4. 
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The  general  procedure  calls  for calculating  the allocation  of different  re- 
sources  over  time that minimizes  the cost of meeting  the demands,  using 
the data on the time  path of demand  for various  energy  products,  on the 
finite  stocks  of energy  resources,  and on the costs of alternative  processes 
for transforming  them  into energy  products. 
MODELING DETAILS 
Given  the immense  trade  in energy  products  it is impossible  to treat  the 
allocation  of energy  resources  as a problem  for the United States  alone. 
The purview  is therefore  the non-Communist  world,  which  is broken  into 
five regions:  the United States,  Western  Europe,  Japan,  the Persian  Gulf 
and North Africa,  and the rest of the world  (ROW).  The problem  is, fur- 
thermore,  of a very  long-run  nature;  in principle-as described  below-it 
has an infinite  time horizon.  In practice,  the analysis  covers  two hundred 
years,  embedded  in a longer-run  model as described  below. 
At present  there  are four important  energy  resources:  petroleum,  coal, 
natural  gas, and  uranium-235.  In the future  oil shale  and  uranium-238  will 
probably  join this  list. On  the  demand  side,  the  model  specifies  five  demand 
categories:  electricity,  industrial  heat, residential  heat, and two transport 
categories. 
Once this framework  is  determined,  there remains little room for 
maneuver.  The  problem  already  strains  reasonable  computational  budgets. 
In particular,  the analysis  cannot  take elastic  demand  curves  or exchange 
rate  adjustments  into account,  although  these  are  important  problems. 
DEMAND 
The five  demand  categories  for energy  products  have  been  broken  down 
as follows: 
1. Electricity. 
2. Industrial  nonelectric  energy  uses: process  and space heating,  rail, 
subway,  and  ship.  There  are  virtually  no constraints  on how  these  demands 
are satisfied  (except  imposed  environmental  standards)  and thus the cost 
of fuel is the major  consideration. 
3. Residential  nonelectric  uses: space and other heating. This use is 540  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
limited to fuels that are relatively  easy and clean to process in small 
quantities. 
4. Substitutable  transportation:  truck,  bus, and 75 percent  of automo- 
bile use. These  uses are  those for which  fuels other  than gasoline,  particu- 
larly  electricity,  can be substituted  relatively  easily. 
5. Nonsubstitutable  transportation:  air traffic  and 25 percent  of auto- 
motive. These are the long-distance  uses that electricity  cannot easily 
satisfy. 
Table  1 shows  an estimate  of the energy  consumption  pattern  by fuel  and 
Table  1. Per Capita  Energy  Consumption  in the United  States,  by 
Type  of Fuel  and  Demand,  1929 and  1968 
Millions  of Btua 




Elec-  Indus-  Resi-  Substi-  substi-  Total 
Fuel  Year  tricity  trial  dential  tutable  tutable  demand 
Petroleum  1929  0.5  12.7  17.8  12.1  4.0  47.2 
1968  7.8  22.2  27.6  45.9  19.7  123.3 
Natural  gas  1929  1.0  3.5  3.1  0.0  0.0  7.5 
1968  17.6  41.0  33.0  0.0  0.0  91.6 
Nuclear  1929  0  e  a  e  e  e 
1968  0.7  0  0  0  0  0.7 
Coal  1929  9.7  76.5  36.2  0  0  122.4 
1968  36.3  24.9  2.5  0  0  63.7 
Hydro  1929  6.6  0  0  0  0  6.6 
1968  13.5  0  0  0  0  13.5 
Total  1929  17.8  92.7  57.1  12.1  4.0  183.8 
1968  75.9  88.0  63.1  45.9  19.7  292.6 
Sources: William H. Lyon and D. S. Colby, "Production, Consumption, and Use of Fuels and Electric 
Energy in the United States in 1929, 1939, and 1947," Report of Investigations 4805 (U.S. Bureau of Mines, 
1951; processed); and Associated Universities, Inc., Reference Energy Systems and Resource Data for  Use 
in the Assessment  of Energy  Technologies  (AU, April 1972). Figures may not add to totals because of round- 
ing. 
a.  The common measure of energy  used in the present paper is the British thermal  unit (Btu). Conversion 
factors are 5.8 million Btu per barrel of petroleum; 25.8 million Btu per ton of bituminous coal; 1,000 But 
per cubic foot of natural gas; and 3,413 Btu per kilowatt-hour. 
b. Substitutable uses are those for which fuels other than gasoline can be substituted relatively easily: 
trucks and buses and 75 percent of automotive uses; nonsubstitutable uses are for aviation and 25 percent 
of automotive uses. 
c.  Technology unknown in 1929. William D. Nordhaus  541 
by demand  category  for 1929  and 1968.10  A glance  indicates  the pervasive 
changes  over  the past forty  years.  They  have taken  two forms:  (1) within 
specific  categories  of consumption  there  have been dramatic  shifts  in fuel 
composition  (for example,  the wholesale  shift  from  coal to natural  gas and 
petroleum,  and the expanded  use of both for industrial  heat and elec- 
tricity generation);  and (2) the differential  growth  of demand  categories 
(such as the shift from rail and water to  automobile and jet  trans- 
port, the rapid  growth  of electricity,  and the decline  in industrial  heating 
uses)."' 
In face  of the  impossibility  of detailing  every  conceivable  kind  of change, 
it seems  reasonable  in projecting  future  trends  to focus  on these  two general 
kinds  of structural  change. 
Unfortunately,  it has not been possible  to introduce  the more general 
substitution  by ultimate  consumers  of other  products  for energy  products. 
Thus the demand  for each specific  category  is a fixed  path over time. To 
have it otherwise  involves nonlinearities  that are computationally  very 
difficult.  Most studies  of the final demand  categories  indicate  that price 
elasticities  are  quite  low, lying  mostly  between  zero  and  unity.  On  the other 
hand,  studies  that  introduce  interfuel  substitution  not surprisingly  indicate 
considerably  higher  cross-elasticities  of demand.  The framework  set out 
here  is more  pessimistic  in one sense  since  it assumes  no responsiveness  of 
final  demand  to price.  But  it is undoubtedly  more  optimistic  in its assump- 
tion  that  fuels  are  perfectly  substitutable  for  meeting  demand  requirements. 
It would  be desirable  to test the sensitivity  of the results  to some  price  elas- 
ticity of final  demand. 
SUPPLY 
The supply  side is much  more  complicated,  but fortunately  the data  are 
much  better.  Supply  for each  product  involves  three  stages: 
10. The common measure  of energy used in this paper is the British thermal unit 
(Btu). Conversion  factors  are 5.8 million Btu per barrel  of petroleum;  25.8 million Btu 
per ton of bituminous  coal; 1,000 Btu per cubic foot of natural  gas; and 3,413 Btu per 
kilowatt-hour. 
11. Two nonenergy  uses for energy inputs that have been omitted are needs for 
petrochemical  feedstocks  and for direct  conversion  of hydrocarbons  into food. I have 
assumed  that 10 percent  of all natural  and synthetic  oil is reserved  for nonenergy  uses, 
which seems adequate  for at least 150 years. After that period, inputs for these uses 
must come from even lower-grade  resources,  which are very abundant  but relatively 
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Extraction  is the crucial  part  of the model,  for the resource  availabilities 
are  the basic  constraining  factor.  Table  2 shows  the distribution  of each of 
the five major  kinds of producible  resources,  by region.  Given resource 
availabilities,  the capital  and  labor  requirements  of resource  extraction  are 
taken  into account. 
Transportation  costs in the model are based on estimated  capital and 
current  costs and distances  involved. 
The  last  step  is  processing  the  fuels  to meet  final  demand.  This  is the  most 
difficult  question  in that it involves  some processes  that are yet unproven. 
In Table  3, which  is a schematic  presentation  of the different  technologies, 
two things  are especially  interesting.  First, it reveals  a considerable  range 
of interfuel  competition,  especially  for electricity  and heat. Second, it 
designates  processes  according  to their state of technical  development, 
starting  with  A, the current  technology  whose  properties  are  relatively  well 
known, and progressing  to D, which  is speculative  and whose properties 
are  little known. 
Table 2.  Recoverable  Energy Resources, by Type of Fuel and Regions 
of the World, 1970a 
Quadrillions  (1015)  of Btu 
Persian 
Gulf  and  Rest 
United  Western  North  of the 
Fuel  States  Europe  Africa  world  Total 
Fossil 
Petroleum 
Proven  reserves  213  70  2,543  756  3,582 
Unproven  but recoverable  350  34  1,755  2,103  4,242 
Coal  33,588  8,626  0  17,915  60,129 
Shale oil  11,362  1,090  0  12,328  24,780 
Natural gas  447  83  3,409  2,268  6,207 
Total fossil  45,960  9,903  7,707  35,370  98,940 
Nuclear 
U-235  ...  ...  ...  ...  1,504,100 
U-238  ...  ...  ...  ...  206,970,000 
Total nuclear  ...  ...  ...  ...  208,474,100 
Total recoverable  energy 
resources  ...  ...  ...  ...  208,573,040 
Addendum:  World  energy 
consumption,  1965  ...  ...  ...  ...  154 
Sources: Given in an appendix available upon request from author. 
a.  All fuels are calculated at their theoretical energy content. Nuclear fuels are not allocated by region. 
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Table 3.  Technologies  Used in Processing Energy Resources, by Type 
of Fuel and Demand 
Technology,  by demand  category,a 
Heat  Transportationb 
Substi-  Nonsub- 
Fuel  Electricity  Industrial  Residential  tutable  stitutable 





Shale  Mine and retort  shale  (B) and 
oil  Refine  for use as petroleum  (A) 
Coal  Use in standard  coal-fired  Gasification  Production  of synthetic 
plant  (A) with:  into  crude  (C) and 
Sulphur  scrubbing  (B) or  either  Refine  for use as gasoline 
Low-sulphur  coal (A) or  pipeline-  or aviation  fuel (A) 






Nuclear  Light-water  Resistance  heating  or heat  Medium-  Hydrogen- 
reactor  pump  (A)  range  fueled  au- 
(A) or  electric  tomobile 
Breeder  re-  automo-  and air- 
actor  (B)  bile (C)  craft  (D) 
Natural  gas  Use in standard  gas-fired  equipment  (A)  Ruled out as uneconomical 
Sources: Developed by author. Underlying process data are given in an appendix available on request 
from author. 
a.  Technologies are designated according to  their state of development: A  = current widespread use; 
B  =  pilot plants operating currently; C  =  in development; D  = speculative. 
b. See Table 1, note b, for definitions. 
Several  potentially  important  technologies  are  not included.  One  is solar 
energy,  indubitably  an attractive  resource  but one whose current  capital 
cost for, say, electricity  generation  is perhaps  a hundred  times  that of con- 
ventional  equipment.12  Another  is the production  of alcohol from grain 
12. Hoyt C. Hottel and Jack B. Howard, New Entergy  Technology:  Some Facts and 
Assessments  (MIT Press, 1971), p. 343. 544  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
crops,  but this method  would  not become  competitive  until  wheat,  for ex- 
ample,  fell to 50 cents  a bushel  (from  the late 1973  price  of $5). It seems  a 
safe bet that no exotic  new  technologies  will become  dominant  within  the 
next decade. 
Table 4 gives a rough idea of the resource costs exclusive  of royalties  of 
Table 4.  Cost of Intermediate  Energy Products Exclusive of Royalties, 
by Sourcea 
Cost in 1970 dollars  Cost in 1970 dollars 
Energy  source  (per million  Btu)  (per  cotnventional  unit)b 
CRUDE  PETROLEUM0 
United  States 
Category  1 Drilled reserves  0.05  0.29 
Category  2 Undrilled  reserves  0.42  2.41 
Category  3 Undrilled  reserves  0.52  3.02 
Category  4 Undrilled  reserves  0.81  4.70 
Category  5 Undrilled  reserves  1.15  6.17 
Category  6 Undrilled  reserves  3.35  19.45 
Persian  Gulf  and  Northl  Africa 
Category  1 Drilled reserves  0.01  0.06 
Category  2 Undrilled  reserves  0.05  0.29 
CRUDE  OIL FROM SHALE 
United  States 
25 gallons per ton of shale  0.96  5.58 
10 gallons per ton of shale  2.00  11.59 
COAL 
United  States 
Liquefied  1.31  7.62 
Gasified  1.19  1.19 
Strip  mined  0.29  6.07 
Deep mined  0.47  9.69 
ELECTRICITY  GENERATION 
Petroleum  2.03  7.5 mills 
Natural gas  1.62  5.5 mills 
Coal  3.17  10.8 mills 
Light water  reactor  2.51  8.6 mills 
Breeder  reactor  3.12  10.6 mills 
HYDROGEN  (BY  ELECTROLYSIS)  5.46  ... 
Sources: The underlying  data for these estimates are in an appendix, available upon request from author. 
a.  All cost figures (except electricity) are at minehead or wellhead. Electricity costs are busbar. Costs 
include direct costs (capital and current costs), but exclude any shadow prices or royalties. 
b.  Per barrel for crude petroleum, crude oil from shale, and liquefied coal;  per thousand cubic feet 
for gasified  coal; per ton for strip-mined  and deep-mined coal; per kilowatt-hour for electricity  generation. 
c.  Petroleum was separated  into six different  cost categories for the United States and two categories for 
all other regions. Category 1, the lowest cost, is drilled reserves, while categories 2 through 6, the highest 
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alternative  processes  for producing  different  fuels,  all in 1970  prices.  (With 
the exception  of electricity,  all prices  are at the well or mine.)  These are 
calculated  at a 10 percent  interest  rate. The projected  costs of foreign 
petroleum  reserves  are  surprisingly  low, on the order  of 30 cents  per  barrel 
for undeveloped  Mideast  crude.  On the other  hand,  the projected  costs of 
synthetic  fuels-such as shale oil, gasified  coal, or liquefied  coal-are  all 
very  high  relative  to both  current  prices  and  to the projected  cost of natural 
fuels. 
THE PROBLEM 
The object  of the problem  is to determine  the allocation  of energy  re- 
sources  (over  time,  space,  and different  categories)  that minimizes  the dis- 
counted  costs of meeting  a set of final demands.  In algebraic  terms,  the 
problem  is to minimize 
E  c(i,j,k,lx(i,j,k,l,m)(1  +  r)', 
(i, j,k,  ,m) 
where 
c =  production cost 
x =  activity level 
r =  relevant interest rate 
and, as subscripts, 
i = country  where  resource  is located 
j = kind  of resource 
k = country  demanding  energy  product 
1 =  demand category 
m =  time period. 
All activities  are  measured  in terms  of delivered  thermal  content  of the  final 
product.  Thus  x(l,1,1,1,1)  (which  is explained  in detail  below)  is U.S. elec- 
tricity  produced  from  U.S. petroleum  during  period 1 in delivered  Btu. 
The production  cost of a given  activity  has three  components: 
c(i,j,k,l,m) =  (1 +  r)-m[ex(i,j) +  tr(i,j,k) +  pro(j,J)], 
where 
ex  =  extraction cost 
tr =  transport  cost 
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These  in turn  are 
ex(i,j)  =  [r +  be(j,  j)] Ke(i,j) +  Le(i,j) 
tr(i,j,k) =  [r +  at]Kt(i,j,k)  +  Lt(ij,jk) 
pro(j,l)  =  [r +  81]KP(j,l)  +  LP(jj,} /eff(j,T), 
where 
Si =  depreciation rate,  i =  ex, tr, pro 
Ki =  investment requirement,  i =  ex, tr, pro 
Li =  current inputs,  i =  ex, tr,  pro 
eff =  thermal efficiency of process, 
and  the superscript  e refers  to the extraction  sector,  t to the transportation 
sector,  and  p to the processing  sector. 
The activities  are 
x(i,j,k,l,m)  -  flow of resource  j from area i to 
demand  category  I in country  k and time period  m, 
where 
i =  1, ...,  4 (the United  States, Western Europe, Persian Gulf and 
North Africa,  ROW) 
j =  1, . . .,  17 (six petroleum categories for the United States, two for 
other  countries;  two shale  oil categories;  stripping  coal; deep  coal; 
natural  gas; four nuclear  categories) 
k =  1, ..  .,  4 (the United States, Western Europe, Japan, ROW) 
I =  1, . . .,  5 (electricity, industrial heat, residential heat, substitutable 
transport,  nonsubstitutable  transport) 
m =  1, 2,...  (1970, 1980, 1990, .. 
The constraints  are: 
Supply:  E  x(i,j,k,l,m)/eff(j,l)  < R(i,j) 
k , l ,m 
Demand:  E  x(i,j,k,l,m)  >  D(k,l,m), 
j 
where  R(i,j) is resource  availability  of resource  j in country  i, and D(k,l,m) 
is demand  for product  I in country  k and period  m. 
THE REST OF THE ECONOMY 
Although  I am investigating  only the energy  sector,  some  thought  must 
be given  to the rest of the economy.  This nonenergy  sector  is assumed  to 
be unconstrained  by resources.  It produces  nonenergy  output  from  capital, William D. Nordhaus  547 
labor, and energy according to a constant-returns-to-scale  production func- 
tion.  To  simplify matters I assume that the social saving is completely 
elastic with respect to the interest rate, so that the rate of return on capital 
is constant at rate r. In addition, whatever secular productivity increase 
occurs is  assumed to  be purely labor augmenting and proceeds at the 
same rate in both the energy and nonenergy sectors; so labor and other 
current inputs are always in efficiency units and the production function 
is unchanging. Thus, any increase in labor efficiency will raise output per 
worker accordingly. 
The only other important simplification I make is to ignore the effect of 
energy prices on capital goods prices-which  in turn affect energy prices. 
This is not serious, for the share of energy costs in the capital goods used 
in the energy sectors is quite small.13  Only if energy prices rose by a factor 
of ten would this assumption need revision, but, as noted below, the pro- 
jected rise in intermediate energy prices is much more modest than this. 
In what follows, per capita income is assumed to  grow as a result of 
labor-augmenting technological progress at 2 percent per annum for the 
United  States, and at higher rates for other countries. As  a result, the 
general price level in the United States will be falling 2 percent annually 
with respect to  wage rates and per capita incomes. All calculations are 
presented in  1970 prices. Strictly speaking, this means that the price of 
capital goods or efficiency  (productivity-adjusted)  labor is considered to be 
a numeraire. 
TERMINAL CONDITIONS  AND  DISCOUNT  RATES 
Because of the very long-run nature of the problem under consideration, 
particular attention must be paid to the terminal conditions. In principle, 
the  planning period for  essential exhaustible resources must cover the 
duration of man's habitation on the planet. It would be myopic, to say the 
least, to devise a rational plan for fifty years, only to find that consump- 
tion must be drastically reduced because the rest of the future had been 
ignored. 
The concept that is relevant to this problem is the backstop technology, 
a set of processes that (1) is capable of meeting the demand requirements, 
13. In 1963, the total direct and indirect  energy-type  inputs (energy  mining, petro- 
leum refining,  and public utilities) were about 5 percent of the total for engines and 
turbines  and for construction,  mining, and oil field machinery. 548  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
and (2) has a virtually  infinite  resource  base. The backstop  technology 
may well be extremely  expensive  relative  to current  technology;  neverthe- 
less, if it exists,  it assures  that the planning  problem  at least has a feasible 
solution. 
For example,  consider  a backstop  technology  for the automobile.  With 
current  output  rates,  available  technology,  and  resources  that are  currently 
economical  to recover,  the resources  for automobile  transport  will last 
perhaps  seventy  years.  Resources  for automobiles  operating  on electricity 
generated  by breeder  reactors  will last approximately  100 million years. 
In some sense,  the current  stage of history  is a transitory  phase  between 
dependence  on cheap  but scarce  resources  and dependence  on more  costly 
but abundant  resources. 
Thus the first  question  is whether  the system  is feasible  over some in- 
definite  period  of time-say,  a thousand  years.  If not, the problem  of de- 
termining  an efficient  solution  does not make  any  sense:  in a programming 
framework,  if the problem  is infeasible  prices  are infinite. 
Next, if the problem  is feasible,  the backstop  technology  is identified. 
Given  the foregoing  assumptions,  the property  of the model is that once 
transition  to the backstop  technology  is reached,  all prices will remain 
constant.  An efficient  program  extending  beyond  T, the time at which  all 
energy  is produced  with the backstop  technology,  will have exactly  the 
same  solution  in the transition  phase,  independent  of the planning  horizon. 
Once T'  is identified,  the period  beyond  it can be ignored  in the compu- 
tations. 
The existence  of a backstop  technology  is relevant  for the proper  dis- 
count  rate  to use  in calculations  of the efficient  program.  In most  situations 
this is 10 percent.  It is supposed  to be an index of the supply  price for 
capital  and of the opportunity  cost of capital,  not of the social  rate  of time 
preference.14  There  is sometimes  confusion  on this question,  particularly 
in evaluating  allocation  of exhaustible  resources.  Recall from  the discus- 
sion above  that a high  interest  rate  means  low initial  prices  and  high  initial 
consumption.  In a sense this pattern  favors  the present  over the future, 
14. The 10 percent  figure  used as the appropriate  interest  rate approximates  the aver- 
age pretax  return  on reproducible  tangible  capital, and as such is a reasonable  estimate 
of the social productivity  of investment.  In 1968  the ratio of profit-type  income (profits, 
interest,  rents,  and one-half  of entrepreneurial  income)  to the replacement  cost of private 
reproducible  capital (all tangibles,  including  land, consumer  durables,  and institutional 
structures)  was 10.6 percent. William D. Nordhaus  549 
but if the opportunity  cost of investment  is also high,  investment  in repro- 
ducible  capital  is a relatively  more  efficient  way of increasing  future  con- 
sumption  than  holding  sterile  resources  in the ground.  Thus  a high  interest 
rate  may encourage  rapid  depletion  of petroleum  and  natural  gas; but the 
resources  saved  by using  these cheap  resources  can be put in the bank  to 
grow  at 10  percent  annually,  and  then  can  be used  to build  coal  liquefaction 
and gasification  plants  and breeder  reactors  in twenty  or thirty  years. 
When  no backstop  technology  exists, however,  a high interest  rate is 
definitely  inappropriate.  If no feasible  solution  exists-that is, if no back- 
stop technology  can be identified-the basic allocation  has no solution. 
Strictly  speaking,  this  leads  to infinite  prices  for energy  resources.  It would 
then be very misleading  to use the kind of analysis  presented  here since 
resource  exhaustion  implies  extinction. 
To summarize,  the interest  rate is an index of capital's  productivity  in 
an economy  with  an indefinitely  feasible  consumption  plan.  To use a lower 
rate to reflect  the social rate of time preference  is inappropriate  unless 
there  is evidence  that  the productivity  of capital  will  be lower  in the future. 
The technique  for calculating  the efficient  path grows  naturally  out of 
this discussion.  In a program  with four fifty-year  periods,  the backstop 
technology  was reached  in the fourth  period.  Thus,  within  the technologi- 
cal specification,  an all electric-hydrogen  basis  for the linear  programming 
model  was reached  in the fourth  of these  intervals,  2120-70.  The expensive 
shale oil and the most expensive  category  of U.S. oil are saved for the 
period  after  2070.  The cheap  shale  oil and about  90 percent  of the coal is 
saved  for the period  2020-70. According  to the efficient  solution,  during 
the next  fifty  years,  1970B2020,  the economy  will utilize  a small  fraction  of 
the world  coal resources,  the low-cost U-235 to be used in conventional 
nuclear  reactors,  and all but the high-cost  petroleum  resources. 
ENVIRONMENTAL  CONSTRAINTS 
The major  shortcoming  of the model outlined  so far is the omission  of 
environmental  constraints.  It has been argued,  in fact, that environmental 
policies  have  played  a major  role in the current  energy  crisis  by removing 
certain  fuels  (notably  high-sulphur  coal) from  the resource  base. Over  the 
longer run, waste  heat, carbon  dioxide,  and nuclear  wastes  may be con- 
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Stringent  environmental  constraints  coupled  with the inability  to find 
technological  solutions  to them  might  very  well mean  drastically  different 
results  or even infeasibility  of the basic  problem.  The approach  followed 
in this paper  is to specify  a set of environmental  standards  that must be 
met by the various  processes.  By and large,  these  standards  are at least as 
strict  as existing  laws.  The  following  specific  assumptions  are  made:  (1) pe- 
troleum  refineries  can process  crudes  containing  up to 2.5 percent  sulphur, 
and produce  clean  gasoline  and fuel oil with a sulphur  range  of 0.2 to 1.0 
percent;  (2) electricity  generated  with  coal employs  expensive  equipment- 
either sulphur  dioxide scrubbing  or low-Btu gasification-which brings 
sulphur  emissions  down  to current  standards;  (3) nuclear  power  production 
meets  the current  Atomic  Energy  Commission  standards;  and (4) the cost 
of all surface  mining  includes  $5,000  per  acre  for reclamation.  It should  be 
emphasized  that the estimated  costs for meeting  these standards  are very 
high. For example,  the reclamation  for surface  mining is probably  ten 
times what  is required  by current  law. 
Perhaps  either  the costs are too low or the standards  too lenient. But 
judging  from the history  of automobile  emission  standards,  the problem 
of imposing  standards  is more  a matter  of time  than of cost. The National 
Academy  of Sciences  estimates  that the stratified  charge  engine  can meet 
the 1975-76  standards  at an annual  average  cost of about $70 per vehicle. 
This means  a reduction  in emissions  of at least 90 percent  compared  with 
the 1970  level (and perhaps  95 percent  for uncontrolled  vehicles)  for only 
2 to 4 percent  of the vehicle's  total cost.15  If these  figures  are at all repre- 
sentative  of what  can be done  to improve  environmental  performance  with 
sufficient  money  and  time,  then  the provisions  for  environmental  protection 
made  here  should  be adequate.  There  are  good economic  reasons  to expect 
that (with  current  technology)  prices  of energy  resources  will rise. On the 
other  hand,  there  is no reason  to rule  out much  cheaper  long-run  solutions 
to the brand  new environmental  constraints.  After all, environmental  re- 
sources  have  been  free  goods-and have  been  treated  as such.  The radical 
shift  in relative  prices,  making  environmental  resources  very  costly goods, 
will promote  technological  change aimed at saving these resources,  al- 
though  this may take time. 
15. "Report  by the Committee  on Motor Vehicle  Emissions"  (National Academy of 
Sciences, February 1973; processed), pp. 101, 116. For standards  and uncontrolled 
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Results  of the Basic  Case 
The basic  case describes  the efficient  allocation  of energy  resources  for 
two hundred  years  (five  ten-year  periods  followed  by two twenty-five-year 
periods  and  two fifty-year  periods).  It is calculated  with an interest  rate of 
10  percent,  and  assumes  that  sufficient  resources  have  been  reserved  to meet 
energy  needs  efficiently  forever  (see pp. 547 ff.). 
PROCESSES 
The first  detail  of the optimal  solution  is the set of least-cost  technologi- 
cal processes.  Table 5 shows the time path of U.S. processes  over the 
planning  horizon.  The discounted  cost incurred  in using  new technologies 
is low at the left and  bottom  (as in using  nuclear  fuel for electricity  genera- 
tion in the distant  future),  and  high at the top right  (as in using  electric  cars 
right  away). 
The first  resources  used are petroleum  and natural  gas reserves.  These 
are  already  drilled  and  are  almost  costless,  leading  to the virtual  exhaustion 
of domestic  petroleum  resources  in the first decade.  Proved  reserves  are 
the cheapest  fuel simply  because  extraction  is almost free and transport 
costs are  low. 
The set of processes  for the next two decades  relies  exclusively  on im- 
ported petroleum  and imported  liquefied  natural  gas, both low-cost re- 
sources.  An efficient  program  for the period 1980 to 2000 does indeed 
involve  heavy  dependence  on foreign  supply,  and the implications  of this 
dependence  for the U.S. balance  of payments  are discussed  below. 
The fourth  and fifth  decades  are a transitional  period.  The first  market 
that imported  petroleum  and gas lose is electricity  generation  and process 
heat. Shale  oil and liquefied  coal take over  the bulk of the transport  mar- 
ket at the end of the fifth  decade. 
The first  part of the twenty-first  century  sees the world  energy  market 
progressively  dominated  by U.S. coal and shale oil. After 2020, virtually 
all energy  processes  outside of electricity  generation  are run on raw or 
processed  coal and shale oil, and the U.S. resources  are about half the 
known  reserves  in these  categories. 
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Table 5.  Time Path of Optimal U.S. Technological Processes in Solving 
the Energy Problem, by Demand Categories, 1970-2120 and Beyond 
Fuel, by demand  category 
Heat  Transportationa 
Substi-  Nonsub- 
Period  Electricity  Industrial  Residential  tutable  stitutable 
Domestic 
1970-80  Domestic  petroleum  Imported  oil  Domestic  and imported  oil  natural  gas  and 
natural  gas 
1980-90  Imported  Imported  petroleum 
liquefied 
1990-2000  natural  gas  Imported 
liquefied 
2000-10  natural  gas 
Light-water  Domestic  High-cost  domestic  and 
2010-20  reactor  high-cost 
natural  gas  imported  petroleum 
Domestic  Domestic  Domestic  and imported  low- 
2020-45  deep coal  gasified  cost shale  oil and domestic  deep coal and  liquefied  coal 
natural  gas 
2045-70  Light-water  Domestic  liquefied 
reactor  deep  coal 
Domestic 
liquefied 
2070-2120  deep coal and 
high-cost 
shale oil 




Source: Developed by author. The underlying data are given in an appendix available upon  request 
from author. 
a.  See Table 1, note b, for definitions. William D. Nordhaus  553 
2020. The use of shale oil and liquefied  coal for transportation  persists 
through  2120.  But  by 2120  all the fossil  fuels  have  been exhausted  and the 
economy is run completely  on an electric-hydrogen  technology  with a 
resource  base that is virtually  infinite. 
The  pattern  of interfuel  substitution  and  the way  in which  processes  un- 
fold over  time are sensitive  to changes  in parameters.  The linearity  of the 
objective  function  leads to extreme  solutions.  For these reasons  the de- 
scription  in Table  5 should  be regarded  as suggestive  rather  than exact.  It 
is somewhat  surprising,  for example,  that nuclear  generation  of electricity 
is delayed  until  2000.  Partly  this tardiness  results  because  petroleum  prices 
are much  lower  in the optimal  solution  than in the real world;  partly  be- 
cause the actual  level of prices  reflects  the substantial  federal  subsidy  of 
the nuclear  power industry;  partly  because  of the rapid and unexpected 
run-up  in prices  of nuclear  generating  equipment  reflected  in the techno- 
logical  assumptions.16 
But, while  its details  should  not be taken  literally,  Table  5 spells  out the 
inevitable  transition  from  exhaustible  fossil  fuels  to nuclear  fuels;  and  this 
basic  pattern  is all but invariant  to such  things  as modifications  in cost. 
PRICES 
Perhaps  the most important  policy  problem  that is addressed  by the re- 
sults concerns  the prices  of scarce  resources.  The programming  problem 
described  on pages 545-46 above  yields  a set of shadow  prices  associated 
with the solution. The shadow prices, shown in Table 6, can be inter- 
preted  as the appropriate  rent  or royalty  that  a competitive  market,  operat- 
ing with the same  information  applied  here,  would  impute  to scarce  low- 
cost resources. 
The striking  thing  about  the basic  results  is that the royalties  on almost 
all energy  resources  are  very  low. The  highest  in 1970  is 42 cents  per  barrel 
on U.S. drilled  petroleum,  corresponding  roughly  to costs for proved  re- 
serves.  This figure  is misleading  since  much of it represents  simply  quasi- 
rents  on drilling  equipment  and past exploratory  costs. 
For Mideast  oil, which  must be transported  to markets,  the royalty  is 
18  cents  per  barrel,  amounting  to about  one-half  cent  per  gallon  of gasoline 
16. See Federal  Power Commission,  The 1970 National  Power Survey  (1971), Pt. 1, 
pp. 1-6-13  to 1-6-15, for a discussion  of the recent rise in prices of nuclear  generating 
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Table 6.  Royalties (Shadow Prices) on Energy Resources, 1970, 1980, 
and 2000a 
1970 dollars 
Resource  1970  1980  2000 
Petroleum  (per barrel) 
Drilled 
United  States  0.42  1.50b  17.93b 
Persian  Gulf and North Africa  0.18  0.46  1 .94b 
Undrilled 
United States  0.00  0.00  0.63 
Persian  Gulf and North Africa  0.17  0.44  1.77 
Coal, United  States (per ton) 
Eastern  deep mined  0.07  0.18  1.23 
Western  strip mined  0.01  0.03  0.21 
Shale oil, United  States (per barrel) 
25 gallons per ton  0.02  0.06  0.37 
10 gallons per ton  0.00  0.01  0.07 
Natural  gas (per thousand  cubic feet) 
United States  0.16  0.32  0.59 
Persian  Gulf and North Africa  0.00  0.00  0.25 
Nuclear  fuel 
Inexpensive  uranium  (per million Btu)  0.01  0.02  0.17 
Source: Derived from the program described in the text. 
a. The royalties are the values of the dual variables on resources in the optimal solution. They exclude 
any future direct cost but include quasi-rents on past direct costs for drilled petroleum. 
b. The resource is exhausted by this date and the royalties are therefore nominal. 
(about 1 percent  of the current  retail  price  in the United States).  For coal, 
the shadow  price  is even  smaller-approximately  7 cents  a ton for Eastern 
U.S. deep coal. In fact, the only relatively  high shadow  price is that on 
natural  gas in the United States and Western  Europe,  which  reflects  the 
fact that it is a very cheap fuel-it  needs no further  refining  and no ex- 
pensive equipment  to make it environmentally  acceptable.  As a result, 
it has a scarcity  rent of 16 cents per thousand  cubic feet for 1970  in the 
United States. 
The fuel prices  that emerge  from the efficient  solution are also of in- 
terest. They are the sum of shadow prices and the costs of extraction. 
Tables  7 and 8 show  the time path for prices  for the United States  to 2010 
and comparisons  with actual  prices  since 1950.  The miraculous  outcome 
of this procedure  is that the calculated  prices  seem  to be much  the same  as 
the market  prices  (except  for petroleum  products  and coal). This finding William  D. Nordlhaus  555 
is particularly  surprising  given  the many  disparate  sources  for the techno- 
logical data and the enormous  aggregation  needed to  obtain resource 
categories. 
Divergent  trends  in calculated  prices  appear  among  the different  fuels. 
The  path for calculated  electricity  prices  shows  a very  gentle  increase  (1.1 
percent  annually  over  the next forty  years)  as full adaptation  to a nuclear 
technology  takes place. The calculated  price of coal is almost constant, 
rising  only 0.7 percent  annually  for forty  years.  The time path for petro- 
leum  prices  is much  steeper  with  calculated  prices  of crude  oil and  gasoline 
rising  at around  4.6 and 3.5 percent  annually.  Natural  gas also increases 
rapidly-3.9 percent  annually-rising from a 1970 level of 21 cents per 
million Btu to a 2010 level of 97 cents. The major reason behind the 
projected  rise of petroleum  and natural  gas prices  is that, with the ex- 
haustion  of petroleum  resources,  the economy  must turn  to considerably 
Table 7.  Intermediate  Prices for Energy Other Than Petroleum 
Produced  in the United States, Actual 1950-70, and Projections to 2010 
Electricity  Natural  gas  Bituminous  coal 
(before  trans-  (cents  per thou-  and  lignite  (fo.b. 
mission;  cents  sand  cubic  feet;  at mine;  average 
per kilowatt-  average  at  dollar  value 
Period  hour)  welihead)  per ton) 
Prices (1970 dollars) 
Actual 
1950  1.16  11.0  8.16 
1960  0.98  18.3  6.14 
1970  0.77a  17.1  6.26 
Calculated 
1970  0.68  21.0  11.91 
1980  0.76  37.6  12.07 
1990  0.85  45.7  12.42 
2000  1.03  64.1  13.34 
2010  1.06  97.1  15.77 
Annual  percentage  chanige 
2010 from 1970 calculated  1.1  3.9  0.7 
2010  from 1970 actual  0.8  4.4  2.3 
Sources: Calculated values are derived from the program described in the text. The electricity price for 
1970  is from U.S. Federal Power Commission, The  1970 National Power Survey  (1971), Pt. 1, pp. I-1-3; earlier 
years assume a constant ratio of production to transmission and distribution costs and use the figures for 
the total from U.S.  Federal Power Commission, Typical Electric Bills:  Typical Net  Monthly Bills as  of 
January  1, 1970,  for Residential,  Commercial,  and Industrial  Services  (1970). Natural gas prices and coal are 
from U.S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook,  1951 (1954), and issues for 1961 (1962) and 1971 (1973). 
Prices include direct costs and royalties. 
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Table 8.  U.S. and European  Prices of Petroleum Products, Actual 
1950-73, and Projections to 2010 
Crude  oila  Gasolineb 
(per barrel)  (per gallon) 
Uniited  Western  United  Western 
Period  States  Europe  States  Europe 
Prices (1970 dollars) 
Actual 
1950  4.34  n.a.  0.169  n.a. 
1960  3.89  2.76  0.152  0.092 
1970  3.23  2.38  0.126  0.059 
Winter 1973-74  4.50-9.99c  12.27-22.80  0.166  0.43-0.67 
Calculated 
1970  1.20  0.052 
1980  1.70  0.065 
1990  2.13  0.077 
2000  3.19  0.105 
2010  7.12  0.209 
Annual  percentage  chanige 
2010 from 1970 calculated  4.6  4.6  3.5  3.5 
2010 from  1.2 to  -1.3  to  -1.8to 
winter 1973-74 actual  -0.9  -3.0  0.6  -3.0 
Sources: Calculated values are derived from the program described in the text. United States: Crude oil 
prices for 1950-70 are price of crude petroleum at wells (Oklahoma) reported in U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 1971 Business Statistics, Supplement to Survey of Current  Businiess,  p. 166. Winter 1973-74 crude 
oil figures are from the New  York  Times, December 25, 1973. Gasoline prices for 1950 and 1960 are from 
American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures, 1971 edition, p. 458. Figures for  1970 and 
1973-74 are derived from an adjustment of the most recent API gasoline price. Western  Europe: 1960 and 
1970 are derived from M. A. Adelman, The World  Petroleum Market (Johns Hopkins University Press for 
Resources for the Future, 1972), pp. 365-66, 377. For crude oil, Adelman's realization less his calculated 
refinery  margin is used. The figure for crude oil for 1973-74, from the New York  Times, January.  29, 1974. 
a.  For  the United States, average annual price of  mid-continent crude oil,  except 1973-74, which  is 
explained in note c. For Western Europe, the prices are monthly averages. 
b. For the United States, average price for regular-grade  gasoline at the refinery  in Boston; for Western 
Europe, average of monthly Rotterdam prices of regular-grade  gasoline. 
c.  $4.50 is the mid- to late December price for "old" oil produced in the United States. A comparable 
figure for domestically produced "new" oil is about $7.49. $9.99 is the posted price for Persian Gulf  light 
crude oil effective January 1, 1974. As quoted in the New York Times, December 25, 1973, these prices in 
current dollars are, respectively, $5.25, $8.73, and $11.65. 
n.a. Not available. 
costlier  processes-either shale oil or coal gasification  and liquefaction. 
Thus in the efficient  solution,  refined  oil can be delivered  in the United 
States at $2.18 in 1970  while shale oil costs $5.58 a barrel  and liquefied 
coal $7.62 (all exclusive  of royalties).  Before  the technological  transfer 
from  natural  oil to synthetic  oil is made,  the price  of petroleum  products 
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The solution  for natural  gas indicates  that the actual  1970  price  is below 
its efficient  level. In fact, natural  gas appears  to be the only fuel that is 
underpriced  relative  to future  availability.  But  natural  gas prices  have  been 
controlled  for two decades,  and  sporadic  indications  of shortages  appeared 
in the early seventies.  In the solution for the basic case, natural  gas is 
underpriced  by about 20 percent;  in other solutions  by much more. For 
example,  in a solution  of the model  without  free  trade,  calculated  1970  gas 
prices  are  45 cents  per  thousand  cubic  feet-almost three  times 1970  levels. 
Thus  it appears  that  for  natural  gas, efficiency  prices  are  substantially  above 
their  actual  levels. 
PETROLEUM PRICES 
The major  discrepancy  between  calculated  and actual  prices  comes in 
crude petroleum  and petroleum  products.  Because the winter 1973-74 
prices  in Table 8 are seriously  distorted  by the Mideast  war and the cur- 
rent  run-up  of commodity  prices,  it is probably  best to examine  the price 
structure  for 1970.  For the United  States,  petroleum  prices  were  far  above 
the calculated  long-run  competitive  supply  price.  The  price  of crude  oil was 
$3.23  a barrel,  as against  a calculated  efficiency  price  of $1.20-a  markup 
of 169  percent  over  cost. For gasoline  the price  differential  was of a similar 
magnitude-12.6 cents  per gallon  for the actual  price  against  5.2 cents  for 
the calculated. 
A good hint as to the source  of the difference  comes  from  the price  for 
Western  European  petroleum  products.  Here  the unregulated  price-that 
is, without  the import  quotas,  prorationing,  and  other  impediments  to mar- 
ket determination  found  in the United  States-was quite  a bit closer  to the 
calculated  long-run  supply  price.  The price of crude  in Western  Europe 
was $2.38 a barrel  for 1970,  about  twice  the calculated  price. 
What  explains  the discrepancy  between  the actual  and calculated  prices 
of petroleum  in the United  States-$3.23 against  $1.20  for 1970?  The first 
source  of the discrepancy  is the considerable  interference  with  the free  flow 
of petroleum  into the United States.  Until 1973  quotas  were  imposed  on 
imports,  so domestic  prices  were effectively  determined  by the domestic 
supply  price.  The  next  section  reports  a calculation  that  estimates  the com- 
petitive supply price for domestic  petroleum  in a world without inter- 
national  trade  in energy  products  at $2.33  per  barrel,  about  90 cents  below 
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Estimates  of the benefit  of efficient  production  are  about $0.85  to $1.00  per 
barrel.  In sum, it appears  that the domestic  price can be explained  by 
import  restrictions  and prorationing. 
While  the discrepancy  of the 1970  price  is relatively  easy to explain  for 
the protected  United States market,  the discrepancy  for the free market 
(Western  European)  price  is more puzzling.  As Table 8 shows,  the 1970 
Western  European  price  was $2.38  a barrel  versus  $1.20  in the calculated 
path. Most of the differential  of $1.18 can be reduced  to payments  to 
exporting  countries.  According  to Adelman,  the average  payment  per  bar- 
rel in 1970  to the seven major  exporting  countries  ranged  from $0.81 to 
$1.09  per barrel,  averaging  $0.93.17  In the efficient  solution,  royalties  are 
$0.17  per barrel  (see Table  6). Thus approximately  $0.76 of the excessive 
$1.18  per barrel  can be attributed  to excessive  royalties  to producer  coun- 
tries.  The  remainder  accrues  in the form  of additional  profits-either excess 
transportation  charges  or rates of return  to companies  greater  than 10 
percent. 
In the period  since 1970,  the royalty  component  has risen  dramatically. 
At January  1974  posted  prices,  the royalties  for most  Mideast  countries  are 
about $7.00 per barrel-seven times the 1970 levels. These are almost 
twenty-five  times the efficiency  royalties  shown in Table 6. As the dis- 
cussion of the efficient  path for royalties  suggested,  the difficulty  with 
market  allocation  of resources  indeed  lies in proper  determination  of the 
royalty  element!  What  lies behind  the excessive  royalties? 
Three  prominent  sources  of the very high royalties  on petroleum  are 
technology,  monopoly,  and instability.  The first  possibility  is that partici- 
pants in the energy  market  may be more pessimistic  about the develop- 
ment  of future  technologies  than I am. To test this possibility,  I ran a few 
cases  that rule out some of the technologies  shown  in Table  3. Within  the 
basic  model  of free  trade,  anything  but the most drastic  pessimism  did not 
seem  to matter  much.  Thus  I first  assumed  that all speculative  technologies 
in Table  3 (D technologies)  were  one hundred  times more  expensive  than 
assumed;  then that all C and D technologies  (thus  including  those now in 
development)  were  one hundred  times  more  expensive.  In both cases  prices 
rose, but the price  of refined  petroleum  rose by less than 10 percent  even 
in the more  pessimistic  case. 
Suppose  that  even  the technologies  currently  in pilot  plant  or small-scale 
17. Adelman, World  Petroleum  Market,  p. 208. William D. Nordhaus  559 
operation  (those  designated  B) will  also  be a hundred  times  more  expensive 
than the current  estimates.  As a measure  of the depth of this pessimism, 
this assumption  implies  that shale  oil will cost at least $700  a barrel;  that 
running  a breeder  reactor  will cost almost  a dollar  a kilowatt-hour;  and 
that coal cannot  be economically  used for electricity  generation  because 
the sulphur  emission  standards  cannot  be easily  met. Even  in this drastic 
case, prices  on petroleum  products  do not reach  current  levels. Gasoline 
rises  to 231  percent  of the basic  level-to  12  cents  a gallon-and the price 
of crude  petroleum  rises  about $2.50 over  the basic  solution.  Natural  gas, 
on the other  hand,  does have a much  higher  price-up to almost  80 cents 
per thousand  cubic feet as against  21 cents in the basic solution.  If tech- 
nological  pessimism  lies behind  the inflated  level of petroleum  prices,  it 
must  be a very deep pessimism  indeed:  it implies  not only that engineers 
will be unable  to solve  the very  difficult  problems  (like  economical  fusion, 
solar, or hydrogen  power)  but also that technologies  that have actually 
operated  in the past  (like  liquefaction  of coal  by the Germans  in the Second 
World War) will be impracticable.  This pessimism  seems to plumb un- 
reasonable  depths,  and  so it is an unlikely  explanation  for the inflated  level 
of petroleum  prices. 
A second  possible  reason  is the presence  of monopolistic  restrictions. 
From  the quantitative  evidence  presented  here,  most of the divergence  of 
market  price  from  the long-run  competitive  supply  price  appears  attribut- 
able to government  restrictions  (oil import  quotas  and prorationing)  and 
to excessive  payments  to producing  countries.  While oil companies  ob- 
viously  are not disinterested  parties,  little of the excessive  price of crude 
petroleum  seems  to go directly  to them.  In 1970,  only $0.25  of the excessive 
$2.03  is left unexplained  by the government  restrictions  and country  pay- 
ments. 
The other  source  of monopoly  restriction  is the control  of price  by oil- 
exporting  countries.  For the last few years,  royalties  to producing  coun- 
tries have been determined  in bilateral  negotiations  between  them and 
major oil companies  in an arrangement  that has led many observers- 
notably  Adelman-to conclude  that the inflated  price  was the outcome  of 
monopolistic  pricing  by sellers. 
Until recently,  it was difficult  to point  to specific  practices  that were  pe- 
culiarly  monopolistic.  While the pricing  was "administered,"  until 1973 
few significant  quantitative  restrictions  were  imposed  and most countries 
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creases  in posted  price-especially  those in 1973-merely brought  the ac- 
counting  price  of crude  oil up to the market  price  and  transferred  the wind- 
fall gains  from  company  coffers  to national  coffers. 
Thus  monopolistic  intent  until 1973  (and  behavior  since  October  1973) 
on the part of oil-exporting  countries  seems plausible.  It is extremely 
difficult,  on the other  hand,  to determine  ex post whether  observed  prices 
result  from monopolistic  behavior  or one of the other causes discussed 
here.  Needless  to say,  the 1973  embargo  is prima  facie  evidence  of monop- 
olistic restrictions  on the part of some Arab producers;  but this is quite 
different  from  earlier  behavior. 
A third  possibility  is that the discrepancy  of the petroleum  price  arises 
because  spot markets  do not assess  the royalty  properly.  I have argued 
above that resource  markets  might well exhibit  incorrect-perhaps  even 
unstable-pricing  of scarce  appropriable  resources,  because  resource  own- 
ers hold back on sales of petroleum  resources  in anticipation  of a con- 
tinuation  of the very  rapid  rise  in petroleum  prices.  If the basic  calculation 
put forth here  is correct,  some of these owners  will be unpleasantly  sur- 
prised  when  they cannot  realize  the anticipated  rate of return. 
The wellhead  price of Mideast  crude  for January  1974  is about $7.00 
per barrel.  If the market  is misassessing  royalties,  some producers  must 
think  it worthwhile  to curtail  production  and  wait  for higher  prices.  Given 
the extraction  costs and a 10 percent  discount  rate,  it would  pay them to 
hold petroleum  in the ground  until 1980  if they thought  that prices  would 
rise at least  to $13.50  a barrel;  until 1990,  if they thought  the price  would 
rise  to $35  a barrel.  If the estimates  for  the costs of synthetic  fuels  shown  in 
Table 4 are close to accurate,  it appears  unlikely  that any country  will 
realize  the implicit  1990  price  for its petroleum  exports. 
Although  the presence  of an  incorrectly  assessed  royalty  is hard  to prove, 
this possibility  seems entirely  consistent  with the calculated  and actual 
pattern  of resource  prices.  If royalties  were  incorrectly  assessed,  how was 
the price  of petroleum  talked  up so high?  And how can it be talked  back 
down  to where  it belongs? 
The 1970  price  of coal also seems  a bit out of line,  but  this situation  con- 
ceals  important  changes  since  1970.  The  dramatic  rise  in the  wholesale  price 
of coal-from  $7.64  per short  ton in 1970  to $12.13  in October  197318-is 
18. The prices are for bituminous screenings for industrial use from Survey of 
Current  Business,  Vol. 53 (February  and November 1973),  p. S-35. The discrepancy  be- 
tween the 1970 figures  here and in Table 7 is due to the fact that the series on average 
value used in Table 7 is not as up to date as the Survey  figures  for industrial  screenings. William D. Nordhaus  561 
probably  associated  with sulphur  restrictions  and mine safety  legislation. 
The  data  in Table  7 are  based  on estimates  of capital  and  current  costs un- 
der  current  standards,  so the predicted  price  is not far off. 
FINAL  USE PRICES 
Table  9 shows  the time  path  of prices  of energy  products  for  the five  final 
demand  categories.  The story  is roughly  the same  as that told by Tables  7 
and 8. Considering  the first  five time periods,  the calculated  rises  for elec- 
Table  9. Prices  of U.S. Energy,  by Demand  Category,  1970,  and 
Projections  to 2120 and  Beyond 
Demand  category 
Heat  Transportation" 
Indus-  Resi-  Substi-  Nonsub- 
Period  Electricity  trial  dential  tutable  stitutable 
Prices (dollars  per million Btu, delivered) 
Calculated 
1970  1.99  0.47  0.54  1.25  1.25 
1980  2.27  0.59  0.68  1.58  1.58 
1990  2.48  0.69  0.80  1.85  1.85 
2000  3.03  0.77  1.10  2.53  2.53 
2010  3.12  0.79  1.55  5.03  5.03 
2020  3.12  0.84  2.53  6.29  6.29 
2045  3.12  1.67  3.03  9.69  9.69 
2070  3.12  3.12  3.12  39.35  46.77 
2120 onb  3.12  3.12  3.12  39.35  46.77 
Actual 
1970c  2.26  0.25  0.57  2.98  2.98 
Average  annual  percentage  chanige 
2010 from 1970  calculated  1.1  1.3  2.7  3.5  3.5 
2010 from 1970 actual  0.8  2.9  2.5  1.3  1.3 
2120 from 1970  calculated  0.3  1.3  1.1  2.3  2.4 
2120 from 1970  actual  0.2  1.7  1.1  1.7  1.9 
Source: Derived from the program described in the text. 
a.  See Table 1, note b, for definitions. 
b.  The price structure for the period 2120 on represents the prices associated with the backstop tech- 
nology discussed in the text. 
c. The figures in Tables 7 and 8 are for electricity, coal, and natural gas used for the first three demand 
categories and for gasoline for the last two. The differences  in levels between Tables 7 and 8, and 9 are ac- 
counted for by the thermal efficiencies of different end uses. Thus 1970 prices for transport would be 3.33 
timnes  the calculated gasoline price in Table 8, which reflects the 30 percent efficiency of automobiles. 562  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
tricity and industrial  heating are rather gentle, slightly more than 1 percent 
annually. For  residential heating and the transportation categories, the 
calculated  rises are rather  larger-2.7  percent and 3.5 percent annually. The 
average rise of energy prices for the five categories using 1970-80 weights is 
2.4 percent annually for calculated prices and 1.3 percent annually using 
the actual 1970 prices as a base. 
ALTERNATIVE  INTEREST RATES 
On the basis of the technological data and a 10 percent interest rate, cur- 
rent energy prices seem about right for electricity, coal, and natural gas. 
But the current prices of petroleum products-especially  gasoline-seem 
far higher than is consistent with the long-run scarcity of energy resources. 
Surprisingly, the shadow prices in the optimal solution were extremely 
insensitive to different  specifications. Moderate changes in the assumptions 
about resource availabilities, growth rates for demand and for population, 
and capital or current costs always left the shadow prices surprisingly  low. 
One natural question concerns the importance of the interest rate in the 
outcome, for the 10 percent interest rate is perhaps debatable. Some might 
argue that the social rate of time preference should be used and might be 
lower than 10 percent (perhaps even zero). Others, accepting the return 
on investment as the appropriate  criterion, might point out that the pretax 
return on corporate capital is closer to 20 percent. 
It therefore seemed worthwhile to test the sensitivity of the optimal solu- 
tion to rates of zero, 1, 5, 10, 20, and 30 percent. Royalties showed little 
sensitivity with higher interest rates because they were so small to begin 
with. At lower interest rates, however, they shifted significantly. The cur- 
rent royalty on undrilled U.S. petroleum rose from zero for 10 percent, to 
about 80 cents a barrel for 5 percent, then shot up to $12 a barrel for 1 per- 
cent, finally reaching $20 a barrel for zero percent. 
The prices of final products formed a different  pattern. As the discussion 
above (pp. 532-33) noted, the interest rate has an ambiguous effect on final 
demand prices, with a higher rate first lowering and then raising them over 
the period in which a resource  is used. As it turns out, current  prices of final 
energy products (except electricity) are minimized  at a 10 percent interest 
rate; they rise roughly in proportion with the interest rate above that level. 
Below it, prices rise slightly as the royalty becomes larger, but only for 
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THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TRADE 
This paper has described a pattern of resource utilization marked by 
close interdependence  and vast trade flows among the regions of the world. 
In the optimal case depicted in Table 5, the United States relies heavily on 
foreign energy sources for much of the period from 1970 to 2020. In this 
allocation U.S. imports of petroleum are projected to rise from an average 
of 3.1 billion barrels  per year in 1970-80 to 7.1 billion barrels  in 1980-90, to 
fall sharply to 4.2 billion barrels in 1990-2000, to peak at 8.7 billion barrels 
in 2000-10, then to disappear after 2010. These figures compare with 1.2 
billion barrels of crude and refined products imported in 1970, 1.7 billion 
barrels  in 1972, and an import rate in mid-1973 of about 2.4 billion barrels. 
Western Europe and Japan show a similar dependency. 
But all is flux, and the winter of dependency passes as quickly as it ar- 
rived. By 2020, the quantity of imported fuels in the calculated solutions 
drops to almost nothing, and American coal and shale oil come to  domi- 
nate trade in fuels. U.S.  coal exports are projected to start in the fourth 
decade (2000-10), then increase very rapidly to $44 billion annually in the 
next decade. American coal and shale oil exports dominate the final two 
periods before their exhaustion (2020-2070). 
It is possible to calculate the balance of payments on energy account 
from the optimal program. To do this, I simply record the flows into and 
out of each region in the optimal solution. The results I present in Table 10 
calculate the cost of the fuel at the port of export, thus excluding transport 
costs and any further processing (such as refining or electricity generation) 
that occurs at the point of consumption. 
The results foreshadow a period of very large deficits on energy account, 
peaking in the 1990-2000 decade at almost $20 billion (or almost 1 percent 
of projected GNP,  both in 1970 prices). The fourth decade embodies the 
transition to a coal technology, with the value of imports almost constant, 
the fifth a very large expansion of exports. In the final periods, covering the 
fifty years 2020 to 2070, the world's oceans will swarm with U.S. coal and 
shale oil in transit, with the value of exports exceeding $300 billion annually 
to 2045, and over $800 billion thereafter. Lest it appear that the United 
States would be turning into a new version of a banana republic, note that 
at their peak, energy exports total about 7 percent of projected GNP. 
Again, the numbers are not to be taken too literally; yet they tell an im- 
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Table 10. Annual U.S. Trade Flows in Energy in the Optimal Solution, 
1970-2070a 
Billions of 1970 dollars  at annual  rates 
Energy payments surplus (+) 
or deficit (-) 
Percent of 
Period  Exports  Imports  Amount  potential GNP 
1970-80  0  1.6  -1.6  -0.14 
1980-90  0  8.8  -8.8  -0.57 
1990-2000  0  19.2  -19.2  -0.94 
2000-10  3.7  19.4  -15.6  -0.58 
2010-20  44.2  49.9  -5.7  -0.16 
2020-45  320.3  24.2  296.1  5.9 
2045-70  836.0  0  836.0  7.3 
Source: Derived from the program described in the text. 
a.  All values are calculated at port of export. Per capita potential GNP is projected to grow at 2 percent 
annually. 
foreign  petroleum  and  gas; but  this period  will  not last  forever.  Sooner  (be- 
cause  oil-exporting  countries  raise  their  prices  above  the competitively  de- 
termined  price)  or later  (as the oil is exhausted),  the world  must  turn  to the 
next fuel up the cost curve.  By most reckonings  this is likely  to be coal or 
nuclear  processes  for stationary  uses  and  liquefied  coal or shale  oil for mo- 
bile uses. The United States  has these resources  in abundance. 
These  optimistic  remarks  do not deny  that  until  coal  and  shale  oil become 
competitive,  the United States  dollar  could  have a rough  time on foreign 
exchange  markets;  for  that  matter,  Japan  and  Western  Europe  will  have  an 
even stormier  time if balance  on energy  account  is all that matters.  But 
there  are  fairly  clear  limits  to the U.S. dependence  on foreign  sources;  and 
there  is a clear  point at which  the rise  in petroleum  prices  will force  exten- 
sive  substitution  of domestic  fuels,  as the following  section  shows. 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY? 
A good question  is whether  the benefits  of trade  are  worth  the problems. 
The  past  months  have  demonstrated  vividly  that oil mixed  with  politics  is a 
volatile  brew.  One  way  of calculating  the gains  from  trade  is to estimate  the 
cost of self-sufficiency,  or autarky-that is, of meeting  all  U.S. energy  needs 
from  domestic  resources  and  all foreign  energy  needs  from  foreign  sources. 
This  calculation  calls  for solving  the basic  problem  without  allowing  any William D. Nordhaus  565 
trade  with  the United  States.  The  costs of meeting  the U.S. energy  require- 
ments are compared  in the basic case, with trade,  and the autarkic  case, 
without  trade. The results  are shown in Table 11. Not surprisingly,  the 
costs of petroleum  and natural  gas rise  dramatically  in the absence  of the 
large  foreign  supplies  to meet  demands  for  the next  few  decades.  The  royalty 
on petroleum  rises  from  $0.42  a barrel  in the basic  case  to $1.55  a barrel  in 
the autarkic  case.  The  change  means  that  a barrel  of crude  oil at the refinery 
costs $1.20  in the basic  case and $2.33  in the autarkic  case.  The royalty  on 
natural  gas  rises  similarly,  from  16  cents  to 40 cents  per  thousand  cubic  feet. 
The  prices  of different  demand  categories  are  also shown  in Table  11. 
The total cost of meeting  the demands  is shown  at the bottom of Table 
11. These figures  indicate  that free trade in energy  products  would be 
Table 11. Energy Prices, Royalties, Costs, and Discounted Values, 
1970-2120, for Basic and Autarkic Cases 
1970 prices 
Cost of 
autarkic  in 
relation  to 
Basic case-  Autarkic  case-  basic case 
with  foreign  without  foreign  (percentage 
Description  trade  trade  change) 
Price by demand  category 
(dollars  per million Btu) 
Electricity  1.99  2.58  30 
Industrial  heat  0.47  0.74  57 
Residential  heat  0.54  0.86  59 
Substitutable  transportationa  1.25  1.98  58 
Nonsubstitutable  transportationa  1.25  1.98  58 
Resource  royalties  (cents per million Btu) 
Proven U.S. petroleum  reserves  7.3  26.7  266 
Deep coal  0.34  0.09  -74 
Shale oil  0.37  0.24  -35 
Natural gas  15.9  40.4  154 
Cost of meeting  demand  requirements 
(billions of dollars) 
1970-80  252  371  47 
1980-90  411  614  49 
Discounted  value  of total  program 
(billions of dollars) 
1970-2120  1,478  2,133  44 
Source: Derived from the program described in the text. 
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moderately  beneficial to the United States. Over the next twenty years, the 
total cost of meeting energy demand is $663 billion under free trade and 
$985 billion under self-sufficiency.  Thus free trade costs one-third less than 
a regime of self-sufficiency. Free trade in energy products is worth $16 
billion a year on the average. It should be stressed that this calculation of 
the cost of autarky assumes that foreign sources are competitively priced. 
The calculation obviously would be different in a real world of short-run 
disturbances or monopolistic pricing. 
The autarkic case presents one significant modification of the basic case. 
If free trade does not prevail over the next few decades, the outlook for 
energy prices is clouded except for electricity. If foreign supplies dry up for 
any reason, the long-run supply price of crude petroleum at the refinery  is 
projected to be twice as high ($2.33 a barrel against $1.20 a barrel), and 
the refinery  price of gasoline 63 percent higher (8.5 cents per gallon against 
5.2 cents per gallon), all for 1970 in 1970 prices. Still, the autarky prices are 
well below the current prices found for petroleum products (see Table 8). 
Thus, while prices might be higher under a regime of self-sufficiency,  the 
current  structure  cannot be rationalized by the belief that trade will collapse 
for an indefinite period. 
Implications  for Energy Policy 
To summarize  the findings, this analysis has investigated the efficient al- 
location of energy resources over time by determining the cheapest way of 
meeting a growth path of final demands for energy products with a given 
stock of energy resources and a given set of processes for converting re- 
sources into products. After ensuring that the program was feasible for a 
very long time period, the procedure was to find the optimal path for con- 
suming scarce resources and the prices associated with this path. 
The basic case allows free trade in energy resources and assumes an in- 
terest  rate of 10  percent. In this case, the scarcity  rents or royalties on energy 
resources are quite modest,  never more than  16 cents per million  Btu 
(equivalent to about one dollar per barrel of petroleum). With 1970 as a 
basis of comparison, the final-demand prices associated with the optimal 
solution are not far from actual market prices, with one exception. The 
exception is petroleum prices, which were about 240 percent of the price 
calculated in the optimal program. William D. Nordhaus  567 
Subject to reservations  discussed below, these results are quite suggestive 
for energy policy. As a long-run  policy it would be unwise to jack up the 
prices of energy products in the interests of artificially preserving energy 
resources. Nor does a more drastic policy of permanent  rationing of energy 
resources make sense. As long as investment yields around 10 percent, it 
seems best to use the cheap resources now and to put the real resources 
thereby saved to work on producing synthetic fuels later. Of course, any 
worthwhile effort aimed at reducing wasted energy should be applauded; 
but judging by their long-run scarcity prices, a dollar's worth of energy re- 
sources saved is no more deserving than a dollar's worth of idle labor or 
wasted capital saved. 
For petroleum prices the lesson is, if anything, the opposite of the con- 
ventional story. Subject to the usual qualifications,  the optimal solution in- 
dicates that the current price of crude oil is inflated considerably above its 
long-run competitive supply price. Before the 1973 Mideast war, crude oil 
was selling at about $4 per barrel and refined petroleum products were 
selling at about $6 a barrel; in current  prices, the optimal solution indicates 
that the  1973 U.S.  east coast price should be around $1.70 per barrel. I 
have not determined the precise source of this discrepancy,  but it probably 
arises partly from excessive royalties to producing countries, partly from 
restrictions on imports into the United States, and partly from inefficient 
regulation. If this description is correct, then a policy that aims at further 
increases in the long-run price of gasoline would be pushing in the wrong 
direction. 
Some dark spots mar this generally cheery landscape. The proviso about 
free trade is of considerable importance. The optimal program depicts a 
world economy  with vast trade flows from energy-rich to  energy-poor 
countries. In particular, in the last couple of decades of this century, the 
United States has a projected deficit on energy account of around $20 bil- 
lion annually. This large a deficit  must strain even an economy with roughly 
double the real GNP of the United States in 1970. 
But if the calculations presented here are correct, free trade offers con- 
siderable gains. The optimal program costs the United States $16 billion 
less annually over the next twenty years than does a program without trade. 
In light of current shortages (especially in Western Europe and Japan), 
are the gains from trade for a highly exposed economy worth the risks? 
While self-sufficiency  seems a laudable goal, many other policies are much 
cheaper. For example, if the gains from trade are $16 billion annually, half 568  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1973 
this amount  will certainly  finance  an oil storage  program  that covers  four 
years'  imports  at $6 a barrel.  There  are  many  ways  to cover  contingencies 
besides  self-sufficiency.  Dependence  on foreign  energy  sources  may  impose 
costs in the sacrifice  of minor  political  objectives  or strain  on foreign  ex- 
change,  but it is hard  to see how, short  of outright  war,  these  costs could 
outweigh  the benefits  of trade. 
A second  proviso  is that  the optimal  solution  depends  to a certain  extent 
on unproven  technologies.  The  system  simply  cannot  run  very  long  without 
development  of a breeder  reactor,  fusion  technology,  or some  other  process 
that rests  on a virtually  inexhaustible  resource  base.  But  time  is not partic- 
ularly  pressing,  and  the economy  can  wait  at least 100  years  for  this  ultimate 
technology.  The  need  for other  sorts  of technology  is more  pressing.  In par- 
ticular,  some form of synthetic  liquid  fuel  must  be developed  quite  rapidly 
to replace  petroleum  when  the latter  is exhausted.  Such  processes  are  in de- 
velopment-shale  oil and  coal liquefaction  being  the most significant-but 
they have  not yet proved  their  economic  and environmental  acceptability. 
On a pessimistic  view  about  the viability  of these  technologies,  the prices  of 
petroleum  products  would  be much  higher  than  in the basic  case. 
The optimistic  picture  painted  here  contrasts  vividly  with the pervasive 
concerns  about  the "energy  crisis."  The results  presented  above,  however, 
are relevant  to the long-run  availability  of energy  resources;  they are not 
particularly  helpful  for managing  short-run  shortages  such  as the nation  is 
currently  experiencing.  Recall  that the model assumes  very smooth  func- 
tioning  of markets,  with perfect  foresight  about  underlying  forces  such as 
demands,  resources,  prices,  technologies,  and  government  policies.  In par- 
ticular,  in the optimal  solution  the capacity  expansion  is tailored  precisely 
to the demand  path, so that none of the important  variables  presents  any 
surprises. 
It seems  likely,  however,  that  the current  energy  crisis  is the result  of  just 
such  unforeseen  shifts  in underlying  forces.  The  most obvious  was  the 1973 
embargo  on petroleum  exports.  World  production  in November  1973  was 
about  5 million  barrels  a day, or 10  percent,  below  the pre-embargo  levels. 
A shortfall  of this  magnitude  in such  a crucial  product  obviously  can  induce 
serious  short-run  disruptions. 
But these events  have merely  compounded  problems  brought  about  by 
earlier  policies. For one thing, industrialized  countries  are locked into 
heavy  dependence  on imported  petroleum  by past decisions  about  capital 
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the U.S. oil import  quotas  posed  a quandary  for oil companies  in planning 
to meet  future  demands.  As long as they were  in effect,  and  as long as U.S. 
crude  petroleum  production  was stagnant,  refinery  building  in the United 
States  made  no sense.  As a result,  when  the quotas  were  lifted  in early  1973, 
refining  capacity  was  insufficient  to meet  domestic  demands.  Moreover,  the 
world boom of 1973 has spurred  a very rapid expansion  in petroleum 
demands  that worldwide  capacity  could  not meet at prevailing  prices. 
Petroleum  did  not stand  alone  as a scarce,  expensive,  raw  material  during 
1973.  In fact, before  the cutbacks  due to the embargo,  most other  com- 
modity  prices  had risen  even  more.  The wholesale  cash prices  of gasoline 
and fuel oil in the United States  were  up 10 and 20 percent,  respectively, 
over a year earlier.  while the Dow-Jones  commodity  index rose 94 per- 
cent.19  It seems  clear  that the "energy  crisis'  is in part  simply  a reflection 
of the current  "commodity  crisis." 
Another  major  disturbance  was the 1967  and 1970  amendments  to the 
Clean  Air Act. Emission  standards  for automobiles  and air quality  stan- 
dards  suddenly  changed  the rules  of the game.  The standards  for automo- 
biles  have  resulted  in a fuel penalty  of 7 to 10 percent,  increasing  gasoline 
demand  in an  unforeseen  way.  The  sulphur  restrictions  have  been  even  more 
disruptive  in that  they simply  removed  high-sulphur  coal and  high-sulphur 
petroleum  products  from  the eligible  technology. 
Direct  interference  with price  has also been mentioned  as a distorting 
influence.  Wholesale  producers'  prices  for natural  gas have  been  regulated 
since 1954;  and  more  recently,  since  August  1971,  prices  for refined  petro- 
leum  products  have  been  subject  to a changing  array  of price  controls.  The 
price  increases  imposed  by oil-exporting  countries  have been cited as an 
example  of exercise  of market  power. 
Nevertheless,  while  these  disturbances  may  seriously  impair  the function- 
ing of the industrialized  economies  over the next few years, a long-run 
policy based on the premise  that energy  resources  are the nation's  most 
precious  resource  would  be a mistake.  Many  have proposed  policies  that 
treat  energy  as  the only  scarce  resource-a kind  of "Btu  theory  of value."  If 
the results  presented  above are valid, they suggest  that the current  crisis 
should  be viewed  as the temporary  effect  of critical  bottlenecks.  They  fur- 
ther suggest  that stress  should  be laid on expansion  of capacity  in those 
19. These comparisons  are for September  28, 1972 and 1973; Wall Street Journal, 
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areas  where  resources  are  abundant-intensified  drilling  for oil and  gas and 
heavier  use of coal; and  that greater  attention  should  be paid  to perfecting 
processes  for producing  clean synthetic  fuels-particularly shale oil and 
liquefied  coal. 
If these  conclusions  are  right,  then the current  "energy  crisis"  will blow 
over eventually.  Real enough problems  remain.  Until supplies are ex- 
panded,  the United States  may experience  very serious  shortages  or very 
high  prices.  In any  case  rising  prices  are  likely  over  the long haul,  especially 
for transportation;  adaptation  to new, potentially  difficult,  technologies 
will present  a problem;  and  several  lean  years  on foreign  exchange  markets 
loom ahead.  But we should  not be haunted  by the specter  of the affluent 
society  grinding  to a halt for lack of energy  resources. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Hendrik  Houthakker:  Bill Nordhaus  is to be congratulated  for blazing a 
new  trail  of analysis  in this  paper.  He has  taken  a sophisticated  approach  to 
some of the policy issues surrounding  the use of energy  resources.  Al- 
though  his paper  does not deal with current  problems,  it has important 
implications  for energy  policy  for the longer  run. 
I would  like to take issue  with Nordhaus'  contention  that free  markets 
cannot  ensure  an efficient  pattern  of resource  allocation.  This position  is 
based on Debreu's  view that a fully competitive  economy  must include 
conditional  futures  markets  that cover all possible  outcomes.  But condi- 
tional  futures  markets  do not exist  for any  commodity;  the futures  markets 
that  are  available  operate  on very  different  principles.  Conditional  futures 
markets  involve  a sharing  of the general  risks  associated  with  future  output. 
It is far-fetched  to assume  that conditional  contracts  could be devised  to 
cover  all contingencies,  and partial  coverage  would result  in frequent  de- 
faulting  on contracts.  Debreu's  theory  is not a realistic  guide  to the prob- 
lems  involved  in allocating  output  and  consumption  through  time.  Further- 
more,  as Arrow  has shown,  security  and asset  markets  can serve  to cover 
the gaps  in the risk  coverage  of existing  futures  markets. 
Nordhaus  appears  to underestimate  the importance  of trade  in existing 
assets.  If price  rises  are  anticipated  for certain  resources,  the value  of these 
assets  will appreciate.  Purchases  of oil in the ground,  long-term  contracts, 
and  similar  transactions  help  to ensure  that  prices  will  not diverge  markedly 
from  the short-run  efficient  price.  Admittedly,  these  asset  markets  function 
imperfectly  but  they  serve  to reduce  large  deviations  between  market  prices 
and  efficient  prices  and thus to eliminate  the instability  of the spot market 
emphasized  by Nordhaus. 
Many  of the current  energy  problems  stem from interference  with the 
operation  of the free  market.  The market  mechanism  has been severely  re- 
stricted  by federal  regulation  of electric  power  and  natural  gas.  Rather  than 
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attribute  energy  problems  to the failure  of the market  mechanism,  I would 
put the blame  on federal  policies  that  have  impeded  the market. 
A serious  practical  problem  is Nordhaus'  assumption  that all demand 
elasticities  are  zero. He allows  for substitution  within  fuel demand  groups 
but not between  energy  products  and other objects  of consumption.  He 
mentions  that most studies  of the final demand  categories  indicate  that 
price  elasticities  range  between  zero and unity;  but even within  this range 
different  values  for the price  elasticity  of demand  can have a substantial 
effect  on the overall  balance  between  supply  and  demand  and  on the calcu- 
lation of the trend  of supply.  Allowing  for some demand  elasticity  would 
not seem  to make  the computational  problem  insuperably  difficult. 
The origin  of the reserve  estimates  underlying  Nordhaus'  calculations  is 
important  to the analysis.  They are based on geologists'  estimates  of the 
amount  of reserves  that  will  be recoverable  at a given  price,  and  are  derived 
from  knowledge  of the quantity  of a resource  that  has  been  recovered  from 
similar  formations  in the past.  The assumed  price  may  be the current  price 
or some other  price, and is rarely  defined.  These estimates  are rough at 
best, and they should  not be taken  literally.  However,  Nordhaus'  conclu- 
sions  seem  reasonable  and  I do not think  that he's  to be faulted  for his use 
of the data. 
I agree  with Nordhaus'  timetable,  according  to which nuclear  energy 
technology  is not relevant  until  the turn  of the century.  The  nation  has de- 
veloped  nuclear  technology  prematurely  in an effort  to promote  science, 
and because  regulatory  policies on power are biased  in favor of capital- 
intensive  processes.  I doubt that many nuclear  power  plants  would have 
been built  in a completely  free  market. 
The events  of late 1973  have  demonstrated  that efficiency,  in the limited 
sense  used  here,  is not the only  dimension  of the  U.S. policy  problem.  Low- 
cost foreign  supplies  of energy  can become  suddenly  expensive  if there  are 
monopoly  elements  in the market.  And they can be interrupted,  causing 
severe  dislocations  in the economy.  So the actual  calculations  that Nord- 
haus makes  are only indirectly  relevant  to the formation  of policy.  How- 
ever, some of these  political  factors  could be built into a more elaborate 
model of the kind  he has pioneered. 
Robert  Solow: This  is a fascinating  paper.  Details  aside,  it is clearly  right  in 
concept.  The most striking  result  is the finding  that the efficiency  price  of 
oil is low compared  with  the current  market  price.  This  does  not mean  that 
delivered  oil is plentiful  today;  tightness  in refining  capacity  and  the recent William  D. Nordhaus  573 
cut-off  of Arab  oil have  curtailed  supplies.  The  immediate  reduction  in the 
supply  of oil has to be met on its own terms  and that problem  is really 
beyond  the scope of this paper.  The current  situation  should  be used to 
spur  research  on intermediate  technologies,  which  have been bypassed  in 
the rush  to nuclear  technology. 
Nordhaus'  discussion  of the instability  of the market  mechanism  over- 
states  the  issue  somewhat.  Monopoly  aside,  he covers  the  point  formally  by 
saying  that  he is illustrating  a situation  in which  instability  might  arise  with 
only a spot market  for oil or without  a global  long-term  planner.  The ra- 
tionale  underlying  this  argument  runs  as follows:  In order  for  a competitive 
market  to be in flow  equilibrium,  the price  of oil must  be rising  at the cur- 
rent  rate  of interest,  since  that  is the  means  by which  owners  realize  a return 
on their  reserves.  If the price  of oil is rising  more  slowly  than  the rate  of in- 
terest,  then oil in the ground  is a poor investment  since it brings  a lower 
rate  of return  than  various  kinds  of reproducible  capital.  If there  is only a 
spot market  for oil, owners  will produce  and sell in an effort  to get rid of 
their  oil as quickly  as possible.  But since  the demand  curve  for oil is nega- 
tively  sloped,  the increase  in the quantity  supplied  will further  depress  its 
price.  Because  expectations  about  the rate  of change  of oil prices  are gen- 
erated  by an adaptive  expectations  mechanism,  reductions  in the price  will 
lead  to even  more  pessimistic  expectations  about  future  prices.  Thus,  the  ad- 
justment  process  that  takes  place  through  the spot  markets  would  result  in 
a worsening  of the initial  disequilibrium. 
But  this  kind  of market  disequilibrium  is not restricted  to exhaustible  re- 
sources.  It would also apply  to the cheesiest  kind of growth  stock, like a 
security  that  does  not pay  dividends  and  never  will,  and  whose  only  value  in 
a portfolio  is its current  rate of appreciation.  The real  difference  between 
the growth  stock  and oil is that oil has definite  uses  and  its owners  have  in 
mind some longer-term  rendezvous  with a future price; to use an old 
terminology,  the price of oil would be anchored  by its value in use, as 
distinguished  from  its value  in exchange. 
As a result,  if the price of oil now is expected  to rise too slowly for 
equilibrium,  petroleum  owners  will take a short-term  capital  loss on the 
value  of their  reserves,  after  which  the  price  will  rise  at a rate  approximately 
equal  to the  interest  rate.  While  this  version  may  be a bit overdrawn,  it is no 
more so than the pure spot market  story that leads Nordhaus  to worry 
about  extreme  instabilities  in price. 
The 10  percent  discount  rate  underlying  Nordhaus'  linear  programming 
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capital.  The  basic  issue  here  is similar  to the one  involved  in public  expendi- 
ture  decisions.  If resources  for marginal  public  investment  come  from  con- 
sumption,  then the consumption  rate of discount  would be appropriate; 
alternatively,  if resources  are  diverted  from  investment,  then that discount 
rate  should  be applied.  A weighted  average  of discount  rates  for consump- 
tion  and  investment  would  be appropriate  when  resources  for  public  invest- 
ment  have been diverted  from  both activities.  I might  point out that even 
with  a utility  discount  rate  of zero,  the consumption  rate  of discount  would 
be positive  if per  capita  incomes  are  expected  to be higher  in the future,  be- 
cause of the diminishing  marginal  utility  of income.  I do not know if 10 
percent  is exactly  the right  rate of discount;  but I would not use a very 
different  number. 
Nordhaus  has excluded  from his model the really  exotic energy  tech- 
nologies,  such  as fusion  or solar  power,  that  cannot  be priced  or dated  ac- 
curately.  The  omission  of such  potential  power  sources  gives  a conservative 
bias  to the paper  which  strengthens  its conclusions.  On the other  hand,  he 
also omits  the use of oil as feedstocks  to petrochemical  industries,  in which 
it is likely  to have a very  high value  for a long time. 
Environmental  constraints  could  embody  a significant  cost and their  ex- 
clusion  from the model is unfortunate.  I am particularly  concerned  here 
about  the disposal  of plutonium  wastes;  little is known  about  these costs 
but they  could significantly  affect  the feasibility  of breeder  technology. 
Nordhaus  tested  the validity  of his results  by increasing  the current  esti- 
mates of costs for intermediate  technologies  by a factor of 100; and he 
found that his conclusions  were affected  very little. Another  kind of test 
would  be to delay  the introduction  of intermediate  technologies  by a sig- 
nificant  period of time, say, 100 years. Postponing  a technology  by 100 
years  would  be equivalent  to increasing  its cost by a factor  of 100 squared, 
or 10,000,  and that might  have a significant  effect  on the conclusions.  If a 
new  technology  is totally  unavailable  until  a distant  date,  the shadow  price 
of oil might  rise  above  the rendezvous  price  in the  interim  and  dip down  to 
its prescribed  level  when  the alternative  technology  becomes  available. 
General  Discussion 
Franco Modigliani  seconded  Solow's  statement  that the most striking 
result  of the paper  was the sizable  difference  between  the actual  and opti- 
mal  petroleum  prices.  He noted  two aspects  of the model  that  would  make William D. Nordhlaus  575 
it tend to overestimate  optimal  petroleum  prices.  Both the price-inelastic 
demand  function  for oil and Nordhaus'  cost assumptions  for substitute 
energy  technologies-which  some observers  would  regard  as high-would 
bias upward  the estimated  petroleum  price  paths.  He also cited three  fac- 
tors that explain  why actual  petroleum  prices  are so high: the very high 
future  price  of oil as a petrochemical  feedstock;  the fact that with  a differ- 
ential tax on capital gains, price  might have to rise less rapidly  to keep 
producers  in equilibrium  between  present  and  future  sales;  and  the monop- 
olistic element  in oil sales. Several  other discussants  suspected  that mo- 
nopoly  pricing  was  important,  citing  as evidence  the existence  of the Texas 
Railroad  Commission  and  the  small  number  of international  oil companies. 
Nordhaus  remarked  that  the influence  of monopoly  on petroleum  prices 
would vary depending  on the definition  of the monopolist  group.  In his 
model,  if the rest  of the world  is assumed  to constitute  the monopoly,  then 
the predicted  price  rises  to midway  between  the optimal  competitive  price 
and the actual  price.  However,  if all producers  of crude  petroleum  were  to 
constitute  the monopoly,  then the price  of petroleum  would  rise  to about 
$5.50  per barrel,  which  is the price  of shale  oil. 
William  Poole  observed  that,  despite  opinions  to the  contrary,  energy  use 
in the United  States  did  not appear  profligate;  per  capita  energy  consump- 
tion did not even  double  over  the period  1929-68.  He also questioned  the 
reliability  of predictive  models such as Nordhaus'  in light of the uncer- 
tainty surrounding  technological  change.  Today's  energy  technology  was 
not envisioned  fifty  years  ago; and the Nordhaus  model would  have pre- 
dicted  badly-it  would  have been far too pessimistic-if applied  in 1929. 
Poole  noted  that  pricing  patterns  in securities  markets  behave  like  a random 
walk with drift. Similar  behavior  by prices  for oil-producing  land would 
signify that prices were being determined  by a process fundamentally 
different  from  the one modeled  by Nordhaus. 
In response  to Poole,  Nordhaus  stated  that  the most a predictive  model 
could  offer  was a "careful  look around  the corner."  He noted  that  the his- 
tory of technology  forecasting  was spotty and that many of the break- 
throughs  in the postwar  period  had  not been  foreseen.  He added,  however, 
that the scope of change  might  have been  narrowed  in the postwar  period 
as nuclear  processes  came  to dominate  experimental  technology. 
James  Duesenberry  noted  that  oil producers  will  use  a short  time  horizon 
in their planning  efforts  since technological  change makes longer-term 
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encourage  the industry  to get high prices  for oil products  in the current 
period  since  the  future  path  of prices  for  these  products  would  be uncertain. 
A system  of rational  pricing  would  differ  from  the current  situation  in two 
important  aspects.  First,  oil products  would  be cheaper.  Second,  the  pattern 
of substitution  among energy  products  would be different;  for example, 
nuclear  power  would  not have been introduced  until it was economically 
viable.  Arnold Packer  added  that uncertainty  had a different  impact on 
ideal  resource  allocation  from  the  point  of view  of society  than  from  that  of 
the  resource  holder.  If the emergence  of a competitive  resource  is uncertain, 
because  the stock of resources  is not adequately  known or because  the 
feasibility  of a backstop  terminology  is in doubt,  society  and the resource 
owner  are  motivated  to opposite  courses  of action.  The owner  is moved  to 
sell his resource  now to avoid the risk of competition,  while society is 
moved  to husband  the resource  rather  than  risk  shortages  in the event  that 
the competitor  does not materialize. 
Charles  Holt expressed  concern  about  the environmental  implications  of 
continued  economic  growth.  Energy  products  impinge  on the environment 
in a variety  of ways  and  Holt questioned  whether  the  model  had attempted 
to account  for these  differential  impacts. 
Nordhaus  answered  that  he had  incorporated  into his model  the costs of 
meeting  existing  legal  restrictions  on environmental  disruption-for exam- 
ple, the costs of reclamation,  as much as $5,000  an acre, associated  with 
strip  mining.  He noted  that one kind  of absolute  environmental  constraint 
that man might  face would  be a limit to the earth's  tolerance  for energy 
derived  from  nonhydro  or nonsolar  sources.  It would  be easy  to incorpo- 
rate  this kind of a constraint  into a linear  programming  model; this con- 
straint  would result  in an initial  reduction  in prices  for energy  resources 
and a rise in final demand prices, since energy resources  would have 
to be used up more slowly. Concerning  petrochemical  feedstocks,  he 
noted that 10 percent  of hydrocarbon  fuels has been set aside for non- 
energy  uses;  this should  be adequate  for at least 150  years.  After  that  time, 
there are immense quantities  of low-grade  hydrocarbons,  which were 
omitted  from the resource  estimates.  Finally,  he agreed  that the problem 
of nuclear  waste disposal  was an unsolved  issue. The problem,  however, 
was not cost, but the "Faustian  bargain"  with future  generations  of be- 
queathing  a low-probability  risk  of disaster.  Unfortunately,  we cannot  even 
judge this probability  until  well after  the bargain  is made. 